政府规制下不同市场力量主导的CLSC决策

发布时间：2018-02-20 05:58

本文关键词： 闭环供应链市场力量博弈论政府规制 WEEE　出处：《运筹与管理》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为了研究不同市场力量主导下电器电子产品闭环供应链(CLSC)决策的差异以及政府规制对决策的影响,在政府规制和无政府规制下建立由制造商、销售商和消费者构成的闭环供应链模型,并分别在制造商和销售商主导市场的情形下,基于博弈方法求得政府最优规制工具、CLSC各成员的最优经营策略和利润以及社会福利。结果表明:无论政府规制与否,不同市场力量主导不会影响销售价、再生利用率和政府规制工具的制定,也不会影响社会福利,但会影响批发价和回收价决策以及各成员的利润,并且当制造商主导市场时批发价更高,销售商主导市场时回收价更高。制造商和销售商通常都在自己主导市场时利润最大。此外,无论市场主导力量是制造商还是销售商,政府规制都将提高批发价和销售价,且当再生利用率指标不高于制造商的最优再生利用率时,政府规制一般都有助于提高回收价以及各成员的利润。
[Abstract]:In order to study the difference of CLSC-decision in the closed-loop supply chain of electrical and electronic products under different market forces and the influence of government regulation on the decision-making, manufacturers are established under government regulation and anarchic regulation. The closed-loop supply chain model composed of seller and consumer, and in the case of manufacturer and seller dominating the market, Based on the game theory, the optimal management strategy, profit and social welfare of the members of CLSC are obtained. The results show that different market forces will not affect the sales price no matter whether the government regulates or not. The utilization rate of regeneration and the establishment of government regulation tools will not affect social welfare, but will affect the decision of wholesale price and recovery price and the profit of each member, and the wholesale price will be higher when the manufacturer dominates the market. Manufacturers and sellers are usually the most profitable when they dominate the market. Moreover, government regulation will increase wholesale and sales prices, regardless of whether the dominant market power is manufacturer or seller. And when the regeneration utilization rate is not higher than the manufacturer's optimal recycling utilization rate, government regulation generally helps to raise the recovery price and the profit of each member.
【作者单位】：西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院;西南交通大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71103149)
【分类号】：F274

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