成本粘性、公司治理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性——基于企业风险视角的经验证据

发布时间：2018-02-28 03:20

本文关键词： 公司治理成本粘性高管薪酬契约有效性　出处：《管理评论》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：成本粘性反映了外部经济风险作用下,企业的行业属性、资产特征以及高管决策行为等因素放大的经营风险。本文选择2005-2012年A股制造类上市公司为研究样本,检验成本粘性对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,以及公司治理因素对上述关系的调节作用。研究发现:(1)成本粘性显著降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性;(2)相比国有企业,民营企业成本粘性与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的负向关系更加显著;(3)相比国有企业,民营企业高管任期越长,成本粘性降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性的效应越明显;(4)相比国有企业,民营企业公司透明度越低,成本粘性对高管薪酬业绩敏感性形成的负向影响越显著。本文贡献在于,深入分析成本粘性放大企业风险,进而影响高管薪酬契约有效性的作用过程,为证明在产权性质不同的企业中,由于公司治理环境不同,成本粘性对高管薪酬业绩敏感性形成有差异的经济后果提供经验证据。
[Abstract]:Cost stickiness reflects the business risk magnified by industry attributes, asset characteristics and executive decision-making behavior under the influence of external economic risks. In this paper, A share manufacturing listed companies from 2005 to 2012 are selected as the research samples. This paper examines the effects of cost stickiness on executive pay performance sensitivity and the regulatory effect of corporate governance factors on the above relationships. The study found that: 1) cost stickiness significantly reduced executive compensation performance sensitivity compared with state-owned enterprises. Compared with state-owned enterprises, the longer the tenure of senior executives in private enterprises, the more obvious the effect of cost stickiness on reducing the performance sensitivity of executive compensation is more obvious than that of state-owned enterprises. The lower the transparency of private enterprises, the more negative impact of cost stickiness on executive compensation performance sensitivity. Furthermore, the process of influencing the effectiveness of executive compensation contract provides empirical evidence to prove that in enterprises with different property rights, the cost stickiness has different economic consequences on executive compensation performance sensitivity due to the different corporate governance environment.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;武汉理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71072103) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2016VI005)
【分类号】：F275;F272.92;F271

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