动态锦标赛中不公平与倾斜政策对代理人行为影响的实验研究

发布时间：2018-03-02 12:19

本文选题：动态锦标赛　切入点：倾斜政策　出处：《重庆大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：锦标赛作为一种相对绩效评估的激励机制,因其具有减少监督成本、排除外部干扰、减少主观评价的道德风险等优点,在薪酬管理、促销管理、专利开发竞争、地方政府间的竞争等诸多领域都有广泛的研究和应用。但在以往的研究中,对该机制的研究更侧重于对静态环境的分析,即在预先制定了规则,代理人具有确定的水平,固定的努力程度。在现实中,由于信息泄露、阶段性总结等因素会导致代理人根据竞争的情况调整自己的行为。由于其多阶段的动态特性和信息共享,动态的比赛可以更深入地表征现实生活,并得到研究者更多的关注。正是由于动态锦标赛多阶段特征更贴近现实生活,引发了我们对于如下问题的研究兴趣:第一,现实生活中,如何针对竞争者在不同阶段相对不同的努力水平实施对应的策略?第二,现实竞争环境中存在的不公平现象会对竞争者的行为产生怎样的影响?倾斜政策,是给落后对象予额外的输出补偿,也就是说,向落后对象予以额外的“偏见”或“照顾”。倾斜政策的实施无疑给予了落后者一个有利的竞争环境,那么采取这一措施是否真的会对他们起到帮助效用?倾斜政策的实施,对领先者而言则产生了一定的竞争压力,对落后者而言却相当于多了一层"保护伞”,这是否会对他们的努力水平和拆台水平产生影响?竞争者以及组织者的收益将存在怎样的波动情况?为了研究上述问题,本文设计了五个努力实验进行了实验研究,重点在动态的比赛机制中探究倾斜策略和不公平环境中的代理人努力水平,拆台情况。通过对134名被试的实验数据进行分析,本文得出以下研究结论第一,不公平将会导致代理人总体努力水平减少;第二,极端不公平将会导致一部分代理人努力水平的提升;第三,倾斜政策只会激发一部分代理人的努力水平;第四,在添加倾斜策略实验中,实施倾斜策略并未增加员工的总产出,即未提高组织收益。最后,从组织整体角度而言,实施倾斜政策,并不会带来额外收益,但此举可以调节组织内部氛围。总之,对于企业而言,应该限制政策倾斜的实施。因为,即使对落后员工实施特殊的"照顾”,并不能提高其收益。相反,实施倾斜政策可能增加企业的交易成本。本文的研究结论对政府实施的宏观政策也具有一定借鉴作用。例如,对高收入群体征收个人所得高额累进税,会减少其劳动积极性,同时助长低收入群体的惰性,从而导致国家的总税收降低。从这个角度看,优惠政策的实施不利于提高员工的努力水平,不利于提高国家的整体福利水平,甚至政府也会加大对这些政策的实施和管理成本。因此,政府应重新评估实施倾斜政策对社会福利的总体影响。故,不公平因素和倾斜策略对代理人的行为影响也为组织管理者决策提供了理论参考。
[Abstract]:As an incentive mechanism for relative performance evaluation, tournaments have the advantages of reducing supervision cost, eliminating external interference, reducing moral hazard of subjective evaluation, and so on, in salary management, promotion management, patent development competition, etc. Competition among local governments has been widely studied and applied in many fields, but in previous studies, the study of this mechanism has focused more on the analysis of the static environment, that is, when the rules are made in advance, the agent has a certain level. In reality, due to information leakage, periodic summary and other factors, agents will adjust their behavior according to the competitive situation. Because of its multi-stage dynamic characteristics and information sharing, Dynamic competition can more deeply represent real life, and get more attention from researchers. It is precisely because the multi-stage characteristics of dynamic championships are closer to real life that we are interested in the following questions: first, In real life, how to implement the corresponding strategies for competitors at different stages of relatively different levels of effort? Second, how does the unfair phenomenon in the real competitive environment affect the behavior of the competitors? The tilting policy is to compensate the backward object with extra output, that is, to give the backward object an extra "prejudice" or "care". The implementation of the tilting policy undoubtedly gives the laggard a favorable competitive environment. So will this measure really help them? The implementation of the tilt policy has produced certain competitive pressure for the leaders, but for the laggards, it is equivalent to an extra "umbrella". Will this have an impact on their level of effort and the level of dismantling?. What are the fluctuations in the earnings of competitors and organizers? In order to study the above problems, this paper designs five experiments to carry out experimental research, focusing on the dynamic competition mechanism to explore the tilting strategy and the level of agent effort in unfair environment. By analyzing the experimental data of 134 subjects, this paper draws the following conclusions: firstly, unfairness will lead to the reduction of agent's overall effort level; second, The extreme unfairness will lead to the improvement of some agents' effort level; third, the tilting policy will only stimulate some agents' effort level; 4th, in the experiment of adding tilting strategy, the implementation of tilting strategy does not increase the total output of employees. That is, no increase in organizational income. Finally, from the overall perspective of the organization, the implementation of a preferential policy will not bring additional benefits, but this can regulate the internal atmosphere of the organization. In a word, for enterprises, The implementation of the policy bias should be limited. Because even if special "care" is given to backward employees, it will not increase their returns. On the contrary, The conclusion of this paper can also be used for reference to the macro policies implemented by the government. For example, levying a high progressive tax on the individual income of the high-income group will reduce their labor enthusiasm. At the same time, it encourages the inertia of the low-income groups, thus leading to a decrease in the country's total tax revenue. From this point of view, the implementation of preferential policies is not conducive to raising the level of efforts of employees and to raising the overall welfare level of the country. Even the government will increase the cost of implementing and managing these policies. Therefore, the government should reassess the overall impact of the implementation of preferential policies on social welfare. The influence of unfair factors and tilting strategies on the behavior of agents also provides a theoretical reference for organizational managers to make decisions.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92

【相似文献】