中国上市公司应如何为独立董事制定薪酬激励合约

发布时间：2018-03-02 17:07

本文选题：独立董事　切入点：薪酬激励　出处：《中国工业经济》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以往的公司治理研究更多关注经理人的薪酬制定问题,对为经理人制定薪酬的独立董事的薪酬制定问题并没有给予应有的重视。本文以2003—2012年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证考察了独立董事薪酬水平、薪酬差异与企业绩效改善的关系,并进一步揭示了相应的影响路径和实现机制。研究发现:在控制了潜在影响因素和内生性问题后,高的独立董事薪酬水平能够显著改善上市公司绩效;而独立董事薪酬差别化带来的效应仅在其平均薪酬水平较高时才会显现。上述结果的出现,一方面与激励充分的独立董事将通过合理制定经理人薪酬来显著提高经理人的薪酬绩效敏感性,进而形成对经理人的有效激励有关;另一方面,受到充分薪酬激励的独立董事将通过更加积极参加会议并向董事会议案出具否定意见的方式来履行监督职能。本研究的开展将有助于公司治理理论与实务界对中国上市公司独立董事未发挥预期作用的内在原因形成全新认识,同时为完善中国制度背景下独立董事薪酬设计相关制度提供政策建议。
[Abstract]:Previous corporate governance studies have paid more attention to the compensation of managers, and not paid due attention to the compensation of independent directors. This paper takes the A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2003 to 2012 as a sample. This paper investigates the relationship between the compensation level of independent directors, the difference of compensation and the improvement of enterprise performance, and further reveals the corresponding influence path and realization mechanism. The study finds that: after controlling the potential influencing factors and endogenous problems, the paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the compensation level of independent directors and the improvement of corporate performance. A high level of compensation for independent directors can significantly improve the performance of listed companies, while the effect of differential compensation for independent directors is only apparent when the average compensation level is higher. On the one hand, it is related to the fact that the independent director with sufficient incentive will significantly improve the sensitivity of the manager's salary performance by making the manager's salary reasonably, and then form the effective incentive to the manager; on the other hand, Independent directors who are encouraged by full pay will perform their supervisory functions by participating more actively in meetings and issuing negative opinions to the board of directors. The development of this study will be helpful to corporate governance theory and practice. The internal reasons why independent directors of listed companies in China did not play their expected role formed a new understanding. At the same time, to improve the independent director compensation design system under the background of China to provide policy advice.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学财政金融学院、中国财政金融政策研究中心;中国人民大学财政金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“独立董事激励机制的影响因素和激励效果———来自我国上市公司的证据”(批准号71272159);国家自然科学基金面上项目“任人唯亲的董事会文化与独立董事更迭的‘逆淘汰’”(批准号71472177)
【分类号】：F271;F272.92

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