股权激励对公司风险承担影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-06 07:21

本文选题：股权激励　切入点：风险承担　出处：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权激励被称为管理人员的金手铐,一直被视为解决代理问题的良方。代理问题的产生是因为委托代理关系中的双方股东和管理者在公司中获得收益的方式不同,他们具有不同的效用函数。而管理者又是不可监督的,是风险规避的理性人,为实现自身效用的最大化就会偏离股东的预期,产生了代理成本。代理问题体现在公司风险承担上就是股东和管理者所希望公司的风险承担不同。公司风险承担是一种公司的行为,这种行为是企业对风险所做出的反应,也称为风险保留,风险自留。公司风险来源于公司的投资、筹资及经营活动,风险承担就表现为对这些活动中的风险采取接受的态度,进而采取一定的行为。本文认为作为解决代理问题良方的股权激励也能够解决股东与管理者之间关于公司风险承担的冲突。首先,本文支持了股权激励与公司风险承担水平的正向相关关系。股权激励使委托人与代理人利益趋于一致,减少了代理冲突。股权激励的设置使管理人员承担的风险设置了下限,而没有限制风险上限。所以委托代理理论的结论是股权激励能够使管理人员克服风险厌恶的倾向,增加符合股东利益的风险承担行为,管理者薪酬理论的结论是股权激励可能会增加管理者的违规性的投机行为,也导致了公司增加风险承担行为。基于这两点,提出股权激励提高了公司的风险承担水平的观点。其次在企业行为理论下,结合前景理论,研究了不同绩效反馈下导致的心理感知对二者之间关系的调节作用:在企业正向绩效反馈时,管理者认为其处于价值函数的收益区间,倾向于规避风险;在企业负向绩效反馈时,管理者认为其处于损失区间,倾向于追求风险。不同方向的绩效反馈对股权激励与公司风险承担水平的调节方向不同。本文认为公司的风险承担行为最终会体现在公司的风险指标中,所以以股票市场收益率的波动作为风险承担的替代变量,实证研究了现行股权激励制度下股权激励对公司风险承担的影响,验证了本文理论分析得出的观点。本文认为基于企业自身的历史绩效预期而形成的绩效反馈,对企业的行为更有解释力。所以以此形成的绩效反馈作为调节变量实证检验了正、负绩效反馈对股权激励对风险承担关系的影响情况。本文期望能够理清股权激励对公司风险承担水平的影响机理,从而有助于企业根据自身情况,合理运用股权激励这种激励手段,完善股权激励实施办法,使公司的风险承担水平符合需要。企业的绩效反馈将影响二者间的关系,如果过去的绩效好于预期,股权激励作用减弱。如果过去的绩效低于预期水平,股权激励作用加强。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is called the golden handcuffs of managers, which is always regarded as the best way to solve the problem of agency. The problem of agency comes into being because the shareholders and managers of both parties in the principal-agent relationship get profits in the company in different ways. They have different utility functions, and managers are unsupervised and risk averse rational people. In order to maximize their own utility, they will deviate from shareholders' expectations. The agency problem lies in the fact that shareholders and managers want the company to bear different risks. Corporate risk-taking is a kind of corporate behavior, which is the response of the enterprise to the risk. Also known as risk retention, risk retention. Corporate risk comes from the company's investment, financing, and operating activities, and risk-taking is manifested by the acceptance of the risks in these activities. This paper argues that equity incentive, as a good solution to the agency problem, can also solve the conflict between shareholders and managers about the risk bearing of the company. First of all, This paper supports the positive correlation between equity incentive and corporate risk assumption level. Equity incentive makes principal and agent interests converge and reduces agency conflict. The setting of equity incentive sets a lower limit for managers to take risks. Therefore, the conclusion of the principal-agent theory is that equity incentive can enable managers to overcome the tendency of risk aversion and increase risk-taking behavior in line with the interests of shareholders. The conclusion of the executive compensation theory is that equity incentives may increase managers' irregular speculation and lead companies to increase risk-taking behavior. The paper puts forward the view that equity incentive improves the risk-bearing level of the company. Secondly, under the theory of enterprise behavior, combining with the theory of prospect, The effects of psychological perception under different performance feedback on the relationship between them are studied. In the positive performance feedback, managers think that they are in the profit range of value function and tend to avoid risk; When the firm has negative performance feedback, the manager thinks it is in the loss range, Different performance feedback has different adjustment direction on equity incentive and corporate risk-taking level. This paper thinks that the risk-taking behavior of the company will eventually be reflected in the risk index of the company. Therefore, taking the fluctuation of stock market yield as the alternative variable of risk assumption, the paper empirically studies the influence of equity incentive on corporate risk taking under the current equity incentive system. This paper argues that the performance feedback based on the enterprise's own historical performance expectation has more explanatory power to the enterprise's behavior. This paper hopes to clarify the influence mechanism of equity incentive on the risk-bearing level of the company so as to help the enterprise according to its own situation. Reasonable use of equity incentive this incentive means, improve the implementation of equity incentives, so that the company's risk-taking level meets the needs. The performance feedback of the enterprise will affect the relationship between the two, if the past performance is better than expected, Equity incentive is weakened. If past performance is lower than expected, equity incentive will be strengthened.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F272.3

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