考虑成本信息披露和消费者策略行为的创新产品定价研究

发布时间：2018-03-07 23:10

本文选题：成本信息　切入点：信号传递　出处：《管理学报》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：由于成本信息的不对称,企业以价格作为传递创新产品成本类型的信号,并以此影响消费者对未来价格的预期和购买决策。通过引入消费者的策略行为,分别在成本为公有信息和私有信息的情形下,构建企业和消费者的博弈模型,分析成本信息披露如何影响消费者的购买行为,进而影响企业的定价策略和利润。研究发现:当成本为私有信息时,若消费者认为企业为低成本的概率越大或者高低成本企业之间的成本差异越大,高成本企业越倾向于采用高价分离策略,反之则倾向于采用混同定价;成本信息披露会降低企业的预期定价,但会同时增加企业的预期利润和预期消费者剩余;不考虑消费者的策略行为时,企业的定价和利润均会提高。
[Abstract]:Because of the asymmetry of cost information, enterprises use price as a signal to transmit the cost type of innovative products, and thus influence consumers' expectation of future price and purchase decision. Under the condition that the cost is public information and private information, the game model of enterprises and consumers is constructed, and how the cost information disclosure affects the purchasing behavior of consumers is analyzed. The study found that when the cost is private information, the higher the probability of consumers that the enterprise is low cost or the greater the cost difference between high and low cost enterprises, High cost enterprises tend to adopt high price separation strategy, otherwise they tend to adopt mixed pricing. Cost information disclosure will reduce the expected pricing of enterprises, but will increase the expected profits and expected consumer surplus. Without considering the strategic behavior of consumers, the pricing and profit of enterprises will increase.
【作者单位】：北京大学光华管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71332006);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272039)
【分类号】：F224.32;F273.1;F274;F275

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