物质资本主导下人力资本的治理诉求及其实现——关于公司治理理论的进一步思考

发布时间：2018-03-11 06:47

本文选题：公司治理　切入点：人力资本股本化　出处：《江海学刊》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：公司治理本质上是公司资产所有权与经营权分离从而形成委托代理关系和信息不对称前提下物质资本所有者(委托人)对经营者(代理人)的激励约束。物质资本所有者作为公司治理主体主导公司治理是合理的;人力资本及其所有者的特殊性与公司治理者所要承担的风险和责任不匹配,决定了人力资本所有者(主要是企业家)不能直接作为公司治理主体参与公司治理。人力资本所有者要参与公司治理,必须使自身的人力资本转化成为物质资本即股本化,而现实中也为这种转化开辟了多种途径,完全是可行的。人力资本股本化既维持了物质资本主导的公司治理模式及其稳定性,又解决了人力资本作为生产要素的相对重要性不断提高而要求参与公司治理的问题。
[Abstract]:The nature of corporate governance is the company's assets of separation of ownership and management so as to form the material capital owner and the premise of the principal-agent relationship under asymmetric information (client) to the operator (agents) incentive. The owner of material capital as the main corporate governance leading corporate governance is reasonable; does not match the particularity of corporate governance and human capital and the owners have to bear the risks and responsibilities, determine the owner of human capital (mainly entrepreneurs) cannot be directly used as the subject of corporate governance in corporate governance. The owner of human capital to participate in corporate governance, must make their own human capital into material capital equity, but in reality it is the conversion to open up a variety of ways. Is completely feasible. Human capital equity has maintained the company governance mode of material capital and stability, but also solve the problem As the relative importance of human capital as the factor of production, the problem of participation in corporate governance is required.

【作者单位】：山东大学经济研究院;
【分类号】：F272.92

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