非控股股东董事治理效应的案例研究

发布时间：2018-03-11 14:27

本文选题：非控股股东董事　切入点：董事会　出处：《哈尔滨商业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：董事会是公司治理的重要机制,在董事会组成成员方面,目前学术领域大部分学者研究主要集中在独立董事对公司的治理效率,以及控股股东对公司的治理效率等方面,但是对于非控股股东董事表现的相关信息不充足,而且获取有一定难度,因此也鲜有对非控股股东董事的研究。但是无论是从非控股股东董事作为内部董事可以参与经营的身份上,还是从非控股股东代表中小投资者的利益上,非控股股东的地位和作用都显得如此重要。故而,就在这样的背景下,通过案例分析,研究非控股股东董事对公司治理效率的效应。由于公司盈余管理是代理理论下产生的严重问题,所以在公司治理效率方面主要研究的是非控股股东董事对盈余管理方面的作用和影响,以及当非控股股东董事发挥治理作用时市场的反应。首先对国内外相关文献进行梳理和分析,然后基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论提出盈余管理的动机和产生的影响和结果,进一步在理论上证实盈余管理和公司治理的效率紧密相关。另外,基于有效市场和决策有用观的作用,我们提出当董事会有信息披露时,很可能引起市场的变动。由此,通过于.工收集,发现S公司有非控股股东董事发挥明显治理效应的条件,通过对S公司1998年到2015年数据的收集,2005年非控股股东董事投反对票情况下,分析非控股股东董事通过这种治理方式对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理产生治理效应,对异常经营现金流量、异常生产成本、酌量性费用的治理效应,以及市场反应的影响。由此提出要改变以净利润为考核的监管办法,多元化经营和适当的奖励机制等系列办法,有利于降低治理成本,有利于公司长期向好运营。
[Abstract]:The board of directors is an important mechanism of corporate governance. In terms of the composition of the board of directors, at present, most scholars in the academic field mainly focus on the efficiency of corporate governance of independent directors and the governance efficiency of controlling shareholders. However, there is insufficient information on the performance of directors of non-controlling shareholders, and it is difficult to obtain, Therefore, there is little research on the directors of non-controlling shareholders. However, whether from the status that the directors of non-controlling shareholders can participate in the operation as internal directors, or from the non-controlling shareholders representing the interests of small and medium-sized investors, The status and role of non-controlling shareholders are so important. Therefore, in this context, through the case study, This paper studies the effect of directors of non-controlling shareholders on the efficiency of corporate governance. As earnings management is a serious problem under agency theory, Therefore, in terms of corporate governance efficiency, the role and impact of non-controlling shareholder directors on earnings management are mainly studied. And the market reaction when the directors of non-controlling shareholders play a governance role. Firstly, the relevant literature at home and abroad is combed and analyzed, and then based on the principal-agent theory, The information asymmetry theory puts forward the motivation, the influence and the result of earnings management, which further proves that earnings management is closely related to the efficiency of corporate governance. We propose that when the board of directors has information disclosure, it is likely to cause changes in the market. Thus, through the collection of. Through collecting the data of S Company from 1998 to 2015, this paper analyzes the governance effect of the non-controlling shareholder directors on the accrual earnings management and real earnings management through this kind of governance under the condition that the directors of the non-controlling shareholders cast a negative vote in 2005. The governance effect of abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production cost, discretionary cost, and market reaction are discussed. Therefore, it is proposed to change the series of methods, such as supervision, diversification and appropriate incentive mechanism, which are assessed by net profit, etc. Is advantageous to reduce the management cost, is advantageous to the company long-term good operation.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F279.26;F832.51

【参考文献】