信息不对称视角下企业成本粘性控制机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-11 15:25

本文选题：信息不对称　切入点：成本粘性　出处：《沈阳航空航天大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：企业之间的竞争日趋激烈,成本管理与控制上升为企业决策重点,企业资源成本利用效率直接影响经营收益。成本粘性概念自提出以来,国内外学者对其的研究热度一直居高不下。截至目前,学术界对成本粘性的研究角度有限,尚未形成一套完整体系。鉴于企业实践与理论研究现状,本文从信息不对称角度切入,对企业成本粘性成因进行分析,将其归结为信息不对称引发的委托代理问题——逆向选择与道德风险,针对不同原因分别设计信息甄别和显性、隐性激励模型,构建企业成本粘性控制机制,进而控制企业成本粘性程度,提高资本、成本利用效率,最终使企业效益最大化。首先,本文介绍选题背景和意义,并对研究思路、内容和方法进行简要介绍。然后,对确定文章选题的检索过程予以简述,并系统、有条理的回顾与梳理了国内外成本粘性及机制设计理论研究现状。其次,讨论信息不对称与委托代理关系,结合成本信息传递流程分析企业内部信息不对称形成原因,并对信息不对称产生的委托代理问题——逆向选择和道德风险进行分析,阐述信息不对称引发企业成本粘性机理。此外,针对信息不对称引发的成本粘性问题,以委托代理理论为基础,建立、分析信息甄别模型和显性激励模型、隐性激励模型,并对显性激励模型加以改进。最终,通过建立的模型机制,构建信息不对称下的企业成本粘性控制机制,从而对控制粘性实施有效控制,为改善成本粘性影响企业效益问题提出对策与建议。本文的创新之处在于以信息不对称为切入点,采用委托代理理论模型、博弈论分析的方法对企业成本粘性形成原因深入分析,通过构建激励模型和信息甄别的方式分析,并在文章的第六部分构建成本粘性控制机制使上述模型得到进一步证明。通过本文的研究扩大了成本粘性研究范围,对其今后研究具有一定的指导意义。
[Abstract]:The competition among enterprises is becoming more and more intense, and cost management and control become the key points of enterprise decision-making. The efficiency of enterprise resource cost utilization directly affects the operating income. Since the concept of cost stickiness was put forward, the concept of cost viscosity has been put forward. Up to now, the academic research on cost stickiness is limited and has not yet formed a complete system. In view of the present situation of enterprise practice and theory research, From the angle of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the cause of enterprise cost stickiness, which is reduced to the principal-agent problem caused by asymmetric information-adverse selection and moral hazard, and designs information discrimination and dominance respectively for different reasons. The implicit incentive model constructs the cost viscosity control mechanism of enterprises, and then controls the degree of cost stickiness of enterprises, improves the efficiency of capital and cost utilization, and finally maximizes the benefits of enterprises. First, this paper introduces the background and significance of the selected topics. Then, the retrieval process of determining the topic of the article is briefly described, and the research status of the theory of cost stickiness and mechanism design at home and abroad is systematically reviewed and combed. This paper discusses the relationship between information asymmetry and principal-agent, analyzes the reasons for the formation of information asymmetry in enterprises, and analyzes the principal-agent problem, adverse selection and moral hazard, which is caused by asymmetric information. The mechanism of enterprise cost stickiness caused by information asymmetry is expounded. In addition, aiming at the cost stickiness problem caused by information asymmetry, based on the principal-agent theory, the information discrimination model, explicit incentive model and implicit incentive model are established and analyzed. Finally, through the established model mechanism, the enterprise cost viscosity control mechanism under asymmetric information is constructed, which can effectively control the corporate cost viscosity. In order to improve the effect of cost stickiness on enterprise benefit, the innovation of this paper is that the information asymmetry is the breakthrough point, and the principal-agent theory model is adopted. The method of game theory analysis deeply analyzes the reasons for the formation of enterprise cost stickiness, and analyzes the way of incentive model and information screening. In the 6th part of the paper, the cost viscosity control mechanism is constructed to further prove the above model. The research in this paper expands the scope of the cost viscosity research, and has certain guiding significance for its future research.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275

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