信用村道德风险防范机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-12 15:30

本文选题：信用村　切入点：运行机制　出处：《贵州财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：信用村模式是解决农村金融市场借款人资金短缺、降低农村信贷市场中由信息不对称引起的道德风险的一种新型信贷管理模式,与传统个人信用贷款相比具有其独特的运行机制。实践经验表明,农村金融市场上的道德风险行为加剧了农村地区的信贷配给现象,而信用村模式的应用对于减轻借款人道德风险行为、促进农村地区经济发展具有很大的积极作用。因此,对该模式在防范农村金融市场上的道德风险行为进行深入研究,对探讨信用村模式运行机理、促进信用村的健康发展具有重要意义。本文采用文献检索法、理论研究与实证调研相结合等研究方法,在详细整理已有文献资料的基础之上,从信用村的运行模式、契约关系、道德风险防范机制等角度入手,运用博弈论和信息经济学的相关理论知识,从借款人的贷款资金使用行为角度入手研究信用村模式的道德风险防范问题,并通过实践调研辅以定量验证。信用村模式中银行、借款人、村组织这三方主体之间存在的复杂的信息传递关系和利益冲突是本文进行研究的主线。本文通过理论分析与实证分析相结合得出以下研究结论:(1)在传统信用贷款模式下,存在较严重的借款人道德风险行为。在传统信用贷款模式下,由于各个村民之间都是相互独立的个体,该模式下的信息传递渠道较为单一,惩罚机制较为单一且惩罚威慑力较低。这两方面的因素使得在传统信用贷款模式下,借款人在获得银行贷款后出于自身收益最大化的目的会以较大的可能性采取道德风险行为。(2)在信用村模式下,能够有效防范借款人的道德风险行为。由于信用村模式中更为复杂和完善的信息传递机制与惩罚机制,其他村民会在银行放贷后对借款人的资金使用情况进行监督,并会采取向银行上报其监督结果、进行社会惩罚等措施。同时,借款人在获得银行的贷款资金后,会以更大概率将资金用于安全性更高的低风险用途。因此,信用村模式使得有效防范借款人因资金使用行为引起的道德风险成为可能。(3)在信用村模式的推广中,仍存在很多制约因素。在实践中,信用村模式存在着以下主要问题:集中用款现象突出,风险高度集中;信用村模式运行效率受规模限制明显;“信用村”的非理性发展。以上三方面因素使得信用村模式很难发挥出对于农村经济发展、农村诚信建设的促进作用。同时,文章根据研究结论与信用村模式在实际发展中的现状,提出促进农村地区诚信建设、保障信用村规模的运行效率、银行与政府共同推动信用村的理性发展的对策建议。
[Abstract]:The credit village model is a new type of credit management mode, which solves the fund shortage of the borrowers in the rural financial market and reduces the moral hazard caused by the information asymmetry in the rural credit market. Compared with the traditional personal credit loan, it has its unique operating mechanism. The practical experience shows that the moral hazard behavior in the rural financial market intensifies the phenomenon of credit rationing in rural areas. The application of the credit village model plays a positive role in reducing the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and promoting the economic development in rural areas. It is of great significance to probe into the operating mechanism of the credit village mode and promote the healthy development of the credit village. This paper adopts the method of literature retrieval, the combination of theoretical research and empirical investigation and so on, on the basis of detailed sorting out the existing literature and materials. Starting with the operation mode of credit village, contract relationship, moral hazard prevention mechanism and so on, using the relevant theory knowledge of game theory and information economics, This paper studies the moral hazard prevention of the credit village model from the perspective of the borrower's use behavior of loan funds, and through practical investigation and research with quantitative verification. The complex information transmission relationship and conflict of interest among the three main bodies of village organization are the main line of this paper. This paper combines the theoretical analysis with the empirical analysis and draws the following conclusions: 1) under the traditional credit loan model, There are serious moral hazard behaviors of borrowers. Under the traditional credit loan model, because the villagers are independent individuals, the information transmission channel is relatively single. The punishment mechanism is single and the penalty deterrent is low. These two factors make the traditional credit loan mode, In order to maximize their income, the borrower will take moral hazard behavior in the credit village mode. Can effectively guard against the moral hazard behavior of the borrower. Because of the more complex and perfect information transmission mechanism and punishment mechanism in the credit village model, other villagers will supervise the use of the borrower's funds after the bank loans. They also take measures such as reporting the results of their supervision to the bank, imposing social penalties, and so on. At the same time, after obtaining the bank's loan funds, the borrower will use the funds with a greater probability of using the funds for safer, low-risk purposes. The credit village model makes it possible to effectively prevent the moral hazard caused by the use of funds by the borrower. (3) there are still many restrictive factors in the promotion of the credit village model. The credit village model has the following main problems: the phenomenon of centralized use of funds is prominent, the risk is highly concentrated; The operation efficiency of the credit village model is obviously limited by the scale; the irrational development of the "credit village". The above three factors make it difficult for the credit village mode to promote the rural economic development and the rural credit construction. According to the conclusion of the research and the present situation of the credit village mode in the actual development, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the credit construction in rural areas, to ensure the operation efficiency of the credit village scale, and to promote the rational development of the credit village jointly by the bank and the government.
【学位授予单位】：贵州财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.4;F275

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