高管晋升激励与财务舞弊——来自上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-18 18:05

本文选题：高管　切入点：晋升激励　出处：《经济管理》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文利用2008—2013年中国上市公司的舞弊数据,采用混合样本和配对样本方法研究了高管晋升激励与财务舞弊之间的关系。研究发现:(1)晋升激励与财务舞弊负相关,而且晋升激励与公司财务舞弊的次数负相关。(2)考虑高管变更,发生CEO变更的年份,晋升激励对财务舞弊的抑制效应明显要弱于没有发生CEO变更的年份。(3)考虑继任者的来源,发现如果继任高管来自职业经理人,该类公司的晋升激励对财务舞弊的抑制作用明显要比继任高管来自控股股东的强。(4)考虑ST类、非ST类公司的晋升激励差异,发现对于具有较强舞弊压力的ST类公司而言,晋升激励对财务舞弊的抑制作用要比非ST类公司的强。此外,本文也考虑了高管权力因素的影响,发现高管权力并不能影响本文的实证结论。
[Abstract]:Using data from 2008 to 2013 China fraud of listed companies, to study the relationship between executive incentive and promotion of financial fraud by using mixed samples and paired samples. The study found that: (1) the promotion incentives and financial fraud are negatively correlated, and the number of promotion incentives and corporate financial fraud negative correlation. (2) consider the executive changes CEO change of year, promotion incentive inhibitory effect on financial fraud is significantly weaker than no CEO change year. (3) considered the origin of the successor, found that if the succession of executives from the company's occupation managers, promotion incentive inhibitory effect on financial fraud than the succession of executives from the controlling shareholders. (4) consider the ST class, the class of non ST company promotion incentive differences, found that the strong fraud pressure ST corporations, promotion incentive inhibition on financial fraud by non ST In addition, this paper also takes into account the influence of executive power factors, and finds that executive power does not affect the empirical conclusions of this article.

【作者单位】：江西财经大学会计学院;
【分类号】：F272.91;F275

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