股权结构对过度投资行为的治理效应——基于混合所有制企业异质股权制衡的理论与经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-24 00:07

本文选题：异质股权　切入点：股权制衡　出处：《中国流通经济》2017年06期

【摘要】：在混合所有制改革的背景下,国有资本与非国有资本的混合主要通过投资行为来实现,这一过程必然加大过度投资风险,但良好的公司治理结构对过度投资行为可能产生调节作用,从而约束过度投资行为。根据股东关系假设,如果制衡股东对控股股东发挥了监督作用,则会降低这种风险;如果制衡股东与控股股东之间合谋共同掠夺中小股东,则会加剧这种风险。由于存在国有资本与非国有资本的客观前提,股东关系会受到资本属性的影响。控股股东持股在10%~50%区间时,如果控股股东与制衡股东性质相异,第二大股东的制衡变量对过度投资行为没有发挥监督作用;如果控股股东与制衡股东性质相同,二者都为国有资本属性时,股东之间的利益行为异化从而产生了制衡效果,表现出"同而不合",二者都为非国有资本属性时,制衡变量对过度投资行为没有显著影响,股东之间的合谋概率较大。
[Abstract]:Under the background of mixed ownership reform, the mixture of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital is mainly realized by investment behavior, which is bound to increase the risk of excessive investment. However, a good corporate governance structure may have a moderating effect on over-investment behavior, thus constraining over-investment behavior. According to the assumption of shareholder relationship, if the controlling shareholder plays a supervisory role, the risk will be reduced. If there is collusion between controlling and controlling shareholders to plunder minority shareholders, the risk will be aggravated. Because of the objective premise of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital, The shareholder relationship will be affected by the capital attribute. If the controlling shareholder is in the range of 10% or 50%, if the nature of the controlling shareholder and the counterbalance shareholder is different, the second largest shareholder's check and balance variable does not play a supervisory role in the overinvestment behavior; If the nature of controlling shareholder and counterbalance shareholder is the same, when both of them are state-owned capital attribute, the benefit behavior between shareholders dissimilates and produces checks and balances effect, showing "the same but not the same", when both are non-state-owned capital attribute, The balance variable has no significant influence on the overinvestment behavior, and the probability of collusion among shareholders is higher.
【作者单位】：北京物资学院商学院;
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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