公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

发布时间：2018-03-24 00:33

本文选题：公司治理董事　切入点：高管责任　出处：《财经理论与实践》2017年02期

【摘要】：董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有"兜底"效应,降低了董事高管的执业风险。选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响,进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异。研究结果表明:董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为;随着公司治理水平提高,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱。
[Abstract]:The liability insurance of directors and executives has the effect of "bottom line" when directors and executives are subject to civil litigation, which reduces the risk of directors and executives' practice. A sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2002 to 2014 is selected. Empirical analysis of the impact of directors' liability insurance on corporate earnings management, and further analysis of the different corporate governance levels, The results show that the introduction of directors' liability insurance will aggravate the behavior of corporate earnings management; with the improvement of corporate governance, the relationship between directors' liability insurance and earnings management is different. The positive correlation between directors' liability insurance and earnings management is weakened.
【作者单位】：海南大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71562010)
【分类号】：F275;F842.69;F271

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