浙大网新股权激励效果研究

发布时间：2018-03-25 04:14

本文选题：浙大网新　切入点：效果　出处：《兰州财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权激励制度在西方国家已经发展、实践几十年之久。在众多激励理论与制度中,股权激励已经成为操作性较强,成效较为显著的激励制度之一。股权激励制度能够长期有效地推动企业的发展,促进国民经济的增长。2005年股权分置改革,标志着我国股权激励制度开始实施。之后,国家相继出台了一系列规范股权激励制度的法律、法规。现如今,越来越多的企业选择股权激励,尤其是在2010年之后,建立股权激励制度的上市公司数量迅速增长。但是,在实施股权激励的上市公司中,并非所有公司的业绩都获得提升。许多企业在实施股权激励时都存在不同程度的问题。有的是因为缺乏对自身内外部因素的了解、调研,所制定的股权激励计划与企业自身情况、发展需求不适应;还有的是因为在股权激励计划设计上就存在缺陷,导致股权激励难以顺利实施。本文基于契约不完备理论、剩余索取权理论、委托代理理论,梳理了相关文献资料,运用案例分析法,对浙江省一家高新技术企业——浙大网新科技股份有限公司实施的股权激励效果进行研究。首先,通过实施股权激励后公司财务业绩、管理者行为、公司股价的变化来分析其效果。其次,从正、反两方面对股权激励的效果进行评价。最后,针对存在的问题从制度设计和公司治理两个方面提出改进建议。研究发现,浙大网新股权激励效果并不理想,最后以失败告终。这让我们再一次认识到股权激励制度所具有的双面性。有效的资本市场、健全的法律制度、合理设计的股权激励计划、完善的公司治理结构才能保障企业股权激励顺利实施。通过本文的研究,希望能够给实施股权激励的上市公司提供些许建议,使他们在实行股权激励时能够尽量规避股权激励的负面效应,使其正面效应得到充分有效的发挥。
[Abstract]:The equity incentive system has developed in western countries and has been practiced for decades. Among the many incentive theories and systems, the equity incentive system has become more operational. Equity incentive system can effectively promote the development of enterprises and promote the growth of national economy for a long time. The reform of split share structure in 2005 marks the implementation of equity incentive system in China. The country has issued a series of laws and regulations to regulate the equity incentive system one after another. Nowadays, more and more enterprises choose equity incentive, especially after 2010, the number of listed companies establishing equity incentive system has increased rapidly. However, In the listed companies that implement equity incentive, not all companies' performance has been improved. Many enterprises have different degree of problems in implementing equity incentive. Some of them are lack of understanding of their own internal and external factors. The stock right incentive plan is not suitable to the enterprise's own situation, and the development demand is not suitable. What's more, there are some defects in the design of the equity incentive plan, which leads to the difficulty of carrying out the equity incentive plan smoothly. This paper is based on the theory of incomplete contract. The theory of residual claim, principal-agent theory, combing the relevant literature, using case analysis, to study the effect of equity incentive implemented by Zhejiang New Technology Co., Ltd., a high-tech enterprise in Zhejiang Province. The effect of equity incentive is analyzed through the changes of financial performance, manager's behavior and stock price. Secondly, the effect of equity incentive is evaluated from positive and negative aspects. Finally, In view of the existing problems, this paper puts forward some suggestions for improvement from two aspects of system design and corporate governance. The research finds that the new equity incentive effect of Zhejiang University is not ideal. Finally, it ended in failure. This makes us realize once again the dual nature of the equity incentive system. An effective capital market, a sound legal system, and a reasonably designed equity incentive plan. Only a perfect corporate governance structure can guarantee the smooth implementation of corporate equity incentive. Through the research of this paper, we hope to provide some suggestions to the listed companies that implement the equity incentive. So that they can avoid the negative effect of equity incentive and give full play to its positive effect.
【学位授予单位】：兰州财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F49

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