高管薪酬与环境绩效——基于上市公司外部治理环境的视角

发布时间：2018-03-25 17:35

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：环境绩效　出处：《上海财经大学学报》2017年05期

【摘要】：为了深入探讨企业高管激励对环境绩效的影响,文章基于委托代理理论和合法性机制,采用我国2009 2012年沪深两市166家上市公司的相关公开数据,运用PSM方法排除内生性因素的干扰,实证检验了在其他条件不变的情形下,上市公司高管薪酬与环境绩效的相关性。研究发现,高管薪酬与环境绩效之间呈倒U形关系,同时外部治理环境对不同水平的高管薪酬及环境绩效能产生差异化影响。研究结果表明高管薪酬是影响企业环境绩效的一个重要因素,为企业在考核高管绩效、确定其薪酬时,将环境绩效水平列为重要的考核指标提供了经验证据,也为政府营造低干预、高法治水平的外部治理环境,并在逐步向服务型政府转型的同时加大环境执法力度提供决策参考。
[Abstract]:In order to explore the impact of executive incentive on environmental performance, this paper adopts the relevant public data of 166 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2009 and 2012 based on the principal-agent theory and legitimacy mechanism. Using PSM method to eliminate the interference of endogenous factors, this paper empirically tests the correlation between executive compensation and environmental performance of listed companies under other conditions invariant. The study finds that the relationship between executive compensation and environmental performance is inversely U-shaped. At the same time, the external governance environment can have different effects on executive compensation and environmental performance. The research results show that executive compensation is an important factor that affects the environmental performance of enterprises. Taking the environmental performance level as an important assessment index provides empirical evidence for the government to build an external governance environment with low intervention and high level of rule of law, and provides a decision-making reference for the government to gradually transform to a service-oriented government and to strengthen environmental law enforcement.
【作者单位】：湖南大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金项目(2012[1707])
【分类号】：F272.92

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