公平视角和努力溢出效应下的供应链委托代理模型

发布时间：2018-03-31 21:55

本文选题：供应链　切入点：委托代理　出处：《南京航空航天大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：信息技术的快速发展和市场环境的瞬息变化使得企业之间的竞争逐渐演变为动态供应链之间的竞争,在动态供应链中成员之间的关系可以理解成委托代理关系。在这种委托代理关系中,代理方为了更好的完成委托方的任务总是尝试做各种努力,而在电子商务和移动互联网的大环境下代理方的这种努力往往是具有溢出效应的。伴随着行为运筹学的发展,人们逐渐认识到决策者并非是完全理性,他们不仅关注自身的收益也关注其他行为人的收益。当考虑代理方的努力具有溢出效应时供应链成员在有限理性的情况下将会如何决策?在努力溢出效应方面本文选取渠道商的销售努力为主要代表,在决策者的有限理性方面本文以公平关切为主要视角,研究了兼顾公平行为和努力溢出效应下的供应链委托代理模型和供应链成员的决策策略。本文具体研究内容分理论和实践两个层面,在理论层面根据代理商数量的不同,分为多代理商和单代理商两个方面,在拥有多代理商时,以代理商之间的努力溢出效应为研究对象,建立了纵横公平偏好下考虑渠道商努力具有溢出效应的供应链委托代理模型;在拥有单代理商时,以单代理商多任务之间的努力溢出效应为研究对象,提出了投入产出公平概念并建立了考虑投入产出公平和努力溢出效应的供应链多任务委托代理模型;在供应链实际层面,本文将Nash讨价还价的参考解作为公平关切的对象来研究渠道商公平关切下和努力具有溢出效应的供应链委托代理模型。根据不同章节具体内容的不同,分别建立了公平偏好中性和不同公平偏好下的供应链委托代理模型,并在信息对称(或集中决策)和信息不对称(或分散决策)情况下进行模型求解和分析,求解出固定支付、努力水平、产出分享系数、最优定价和最优订货量等委托代理主要参数,通过算例分析和MATLAB仿真,得出了在公平偏好系数和努力溢出效应变化时对委托代理模型以及供应链各方利益的影响关系。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of information technology and the rapid change of market environment, the competition among enterprises is gradually evolving into the competition between dynamic supply chains. In the dynamic supply chain, the relationship between members can be understood as principal-agent relationship. In this principal-agent relationship, the agent always tries to do all kinds of work in order to better fulfill the task of the client. However, in the context of electronic commerce and mobile Internet, this kind of agent's efforts often have spillover effects. With the development of behavioral operational research, people have come to realize that the decision makers are not completely rational. They pay attention not only to their own benefits but also to the benefits of other actors. When considering the spillover effect of agents' efforts, how will supply chain members make decisions in the case of limited rationality? In the aspect of the spillover effect of effort, this paper chooses the sales efforts of the channel operators as the main representative, and takes the equity concern as the main angle of view in the limited rationality of the decision-makers. This paper studies the principal-agent model of supply chain and the decision strategy of supply chain members under the consideration of fair behavior and effort spillover effect. The content of this paper is divided into two levels: theory and practice. It is divided into two aspects: multiple agents and single agents. When there are many agents, the spillover effect between agents is taken as the object of study. This paper establishes a supply chain principal-agent model considering the spillover effect of channel firms' efforts under the preference of vertical and horizontal equity, and takes the effort spillover effect between single-agent and multi-task as the object of study when there are single agents. This paper puts forward the concept of input-output equity and establishes a supply chain multi-task principal-agent model considering input-output equity and effort spillover effect. In this paper, the reference solution of Nash bargaining is taken as the object of fair concern to study the supply chain principal-agent model with spill-over effect under the fair concern of the channel provider and the effort. According to the different contents of different chapters, this paper studies the supply chain principal-agent model. The supply chain principal-agent models with neutral and different fair preferences are established, and the fixed payment is solved and analyzed in the case of information symmetry (or centralized decision) and information asymmetry (or decentralized decision). The principal parameters of principal-agent, such as effort level, output sharing coefficient, optimal pricing and optimal order quantity, are analyzed by example and simulated by MATLAB. The influence of fair preference coefficient and effort spillover effect on the principal-agent model and the interests of all parties in the supply chain is obtained.
【学位授予单位】：南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274

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