消费者低碳偏好下零售商主导供应链减排合作与协调

发布时间：2018-04-04 06:31

本文选题：低碳偏好　切入点：碳交易　出处：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年12期

【摘要】：针对零售商主导供应链在碳交易和消费者低碳偏好下的减排合作决策问题,以供应商不减排投资分散决策模型为基础,建立了供应商减排投资的斯坦伯格博弈和垂直纳什博弈不合作模型及集中决策合作博弈模型.给出了供应商减排投资和选择垂直纳什博弈的条件,分析了零售价、减排量、需求和供应链成员利润的变化.研究发现,供应商投资减排,供应商和零售商的利润均增加且供应商利润在垂直纳什博弈均衡时比斯坦伯格博弈均衡时大,但斯坦伯格博弈和垂直纳什博弈均不能实现低碳供应链协调;特定条件下的垂直纳什博弈和集中决策的零售价格低于供应商不进行减排投资下的普通产品零售价格,即低碳并不一定高价.指出零售商具有选择与供应商进行投资减排合作的动力,从而构建了供应商和零售商共同决策批发价格的纳什讨价还价博弈模型来实现供应链减排合作与利润分配.最后,通过算例对模型进行了验证分析.
[Abstract]:According to the emission reduction cooperation decision problem leading retailer supply chain in low carbon carbon trading and consumer preferences, in order to supplier reduction investment decentralized decision-making model as the foundation, established the Steinberg game supplier reduction investment and vertical Nash game cooperation model and centralized decision-making cooperative game model is given. The supplier reduction investment and choice of vertical Nash game the condition analysis of retail price reductions, changes in demand and profits of supply chain members. The study found that suppliers to invest in emission reduction, the supplier and the retailer's profit increased and supplier's profit in the vertical Nash equilibrium than the Steinberg equilibrium when the game, but Steinberg and Nash cannot realize vertical game of low carbon supply chain vertical coordination; Nash game under certain conditions and centralized decision the retail price is lower than the supplier is not reduce investment The average retail price of products, namely low carbon does not necessarily high. It is pointed out that the retailer has the supplier selection and dynamic reduction investment cooperation, in order to build a joint decision of supplier and retailer Nash bargaining game model of the wholesale price to achieve emission reduction in supply chain cooperation and profit distribution. Finally, through the example of the model was verified.

【作者单位】：重庆交通大学经济与管理学院;电子科技大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71531003,71471024,71601031) 重庆币基础与前沿研究项目(cstc2016jcyjA0023)~~
【分类号】：F274

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