内部控制、机构投资者与真实盈余管理——基于央企、地方国企和其他企业的划分

发布时间：2018-04-07 17:26

本文选题：内部控制　切入点：机构投资者　出处：《华东经济管理》2017年04期

【摘要】：文章利用迪博内部控制指数,以2009-2014年非金融上市公司作为实证研究样本,细分央企、地方国企和非国有企业。研究发现,真实盈余管理程度随着内部控制质量和机构投资者持股比例的提高而显著降低,内部控制在机构投资者负向影响真实盈余管理过程中发挥了部分中介效应,机构投资者持股比例增强了内部控制对真实盈余管理的抑制作用;内部控制在央企中对真实盈余管理的抑制作用最为显著,机构投资者在央企中对真实盈余管理的抑制作用不显著。
[Abstract]:Based on the Debo internal control index, this paper takes the 2009-2014 non-financial listed companies as an empirical research sample to subdivide the state-owned enterprises, local state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.It is found that the degree of real earnings management decreases significantly with the improvement of internal control quality and the proportion of institutional investors' shareholding, and that internal control plays a part of intermediary effect in the process of institutional investors' negative influence on real earnings management.The proportion of institutional investors' shareholding enhances the inhibition effect of internal control on real earnings management, and the inhibition effect of internal control on real earnings management is most significant in the central enterprises.Institutional investors in the central enterprises in the real earnings management inhibition effect is not significant.
【作者单位】：天津财经大学商学院;山东政法学院商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71332008) 天津市哲学社会科学规划项目(TJGL15-015) 山东省社会科学规划项目(15CGLJ12)
【分类号】：F275

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