内部控制缺陷披露对企业投资效率的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-08 08:03

本文选题：内部控制缺陷披露　切入点：投资效率　出处：《兰州理工大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：2002年美国SOX法案的颁布对企业内部控制信息披露产生了重大影响,我国2008年颁布的《企业内部控制基本规范》和2010年颁布的《企业内部控制配套指引》也相继出台了要求上市公司披露包含内部控制缺陷在内的内部控制自我评价报告。在资本市场中披露内部控制缺陷作为一种有效缓解信息不对称的信号传递行为,其产生的经济后果受到了国内外学者的广泛关注和研究。企业在披露内部控制缺陷后通过引发信号传递,可以有效地缓解经营治理层面的信息不对称,使企业利益相关者意识到企业经营治理等层面的漏洞。迫于各利益相关者施加的有形无形的压力,管理层必定会加大对企业经营治理等方面的监督控制,抑制企业外部投资者的逆向选择和企业经营管理层的道德风险,使得企业的经营治理更加公开化、透明化,企业的投资决策得到更好的监督和制约,优化了企业有限资金的配置效率,进而提高企业的投资效率。本文基于2012年我国上市公司内部控制缺陷披露由自愿性转入到强制性阶段这一现状,以我国2010——2014年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司数据为样本,结合信号传递理论、信息不对称理论、委托代理理论以及投资理论,实证检验了不同融资约束程度下内部控制缺陷披露对企业投资效率的影响,以及自愿性内部控制缺陷披露与强制性内部控制缺陷披露对企业投资效率的影响差异。本文研究发现:(1)不受融资约束的企业在披露内部控制缺陷的前一年通常会投资过度;受到融资约束的企业在披露内部控制缺陷的前一年通常会投资不足。(2)不受融资约束的企业在披露内部控制缺陷后一到两年,投资过度会得到缓解;受到融资约束的企业在披露内部控制缺陷后一到两年,投资不足会得到缓解。(3)在不受融资约束的企业中,强制性内部控制缺陷披露比自愿性内部控制缺陷披露对过度投资的缓解作用更强;在受到融资约束的企业中,强制性内部控制缺陷披露比自愿性内部控制缺陷披露对投资不足的缓解作用更强。本文的研究拓宽了我国内部控制缺陷披露经济后果的研究;为评价2010年《企业内部控制配套指引》颁布实施后的经济后果提供了微观证据支持。本文的研究结果有助于政策制定部门完善内部控制缺陷披露规范,强化内部控制缺陷强制性披露力度;有助于企业完善内部控制建设,提高企业投资效率。
[Abstract]:The promulgation of the SOX Act in 2002 has had a great impact on the disclosure of internal control information in enterprises.The basic norms of internal control of enterprises promulgated in 2008 and the supporting guidelines of internal control of enterprises issued in 2010 also require listed companies to disclose internal control self-evaluation reports including internal control defects one after another.The disclosure of internal control defects in the capital market is an effective way to alleviate the information asymmetry, and its economic consequences have been widely paid attention to and studied by scholars at home and abroad.After disclosure of internal control defects, enterprises can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry at the level of management and governance by triggering signal transmission, and make the stakeholders aware of the loopholes in the level of enterprise management and governance.Under the visible and intangible pressure from the stakeholders, the management will strengthen the supervision and control of the enterprise management, and restrain the adverse selection of the external investors and the moral hazard of the management.It makes the management of the enterprise more open and transparent, and the investment decision of the enterprise gets better supervision and restriction, which optimizes the allocation efficiency of the limited capital of the enterprise, and then improves the investment efficiency of the enterprise.Based on the fact that the disclosure of internal control defects in China's listed companies changed from voluntary to mandatory in 2012, this paper takes the data of non-financial A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2010-2014 as a sample, and combines with the theory of signal transmission.The information asymmetry theory, the principal-agent theory and the investment theory empirically test the influence of internal control defect disclosure on the investment efficiency of enterprises under different financing constraints.And the difference between voluntary internal control defect disclosure and mandatory internal control defect disclosure on investment efficiency.This paper finds that: (1) firms that are not subject to financing constraints usually overinvest in the year before disclosure of internal control defects;Enterprises subject to financing constraints usually have insufficient investment in the year before disclosure of internal control defects.) firms that are not subject to financing constraints will have excessive investment mitigated one to two years after disclosure of internal control defects;A year or two after disclosure of deficiencies in internal controls, underinvestment will be alleviated by companies subject to financing constraints.) in enterprises that are not subject to financing constraints,Mandatory internal control defect disclosure has a stronger mitigation effect on overinvestment than voluntary internal control defect disclosure; in enterprises subject to financing constraints,Mandatory internal control defect disclosure is more effective than voluntary internal control defect disclosure in alleviating underinvestment.The research in this paper broadens the research on the economic consequences of the disclosure of internal control defects in China, and provides microcosmic evidence for evaluating the economic consequences after the promulgation and implementation of the "Internal Control supporting guidelines for Enterprises" in 2010.The research results of this paper are helpful for the policy-making department to perfect the internal control defect disclosure standard, to strengthen the internal control defect mandatory disclosure strength, to help the enterprise to perfect the internal control construction, to improve the enterprise investment efficiency.
【学位授予单位】：兰州理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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