政府补贴捐赠下的再制造决策及激励影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-08 18:03

本文选题：政府补贴　切入点：再制造　出处：《华东经济管理》2017年03期

【摘要】：文章基于再制造品质量优、成本低的特点,提出了政府补贴-企业捐赠的再制造品激励政策,构建了政府补贴下制造商销售和捐赠再制造品的数量模型,通过分析完全垄断和寡头竞争两种市场下的制造商决策,研究发现:只有政府补贴满足一定的阈值范围,捐赠和销售行为才会同时发生,但竞争削弱了政府补贴的激励作用,随着竞争强度的增加,需要更高的政府补贴才足以有效激励制造商;捐赠行为会导致再制造品销售产生溢价效应,一定范围内的政府补贴会强化溢价效应;捐赠行为会蚕食再制造品的销售量,竞争强度增加会削弱蚕食效应;捐赠行为增加了再制造品的总需求量,刺激了EOL产品的再循环利用,更多的再制造品产生了积极的环境效益,同时也改善了经济效益。
[Abstract]:Based on the characteristics of high quality and low cost of remanufactured products, this paper puts forward the incentive policy of government subsidy and enterprise donation of remanufactured products, and constructs the quantity model of remanufactured products sold and donated by manufacturers under government subsidy.Based on the analysis of the manufacturer's decision in the two markets of complete monopoly and oligopoly, it is found that only when the government subsidy meets a certain threshold range, the donation and sales behavior will occur simultaneously, but competition weakens the incentive function of the government subsidy.With the increase of competition intensity, higher government subsidies are needed to encourage manufacturers effectively; donation will lead to the premium effect of re-manufactured goods sales, and government subsidies in a certain range will strengthen the premium effect.Giving behavior eats away at sales of remanufactured goods, and increases competition weakens the cannibalization effect; it increases the total demand for recycled manufactured goods and stimulates recycling of EOL products.More remanufactured products produce positive environmental benefits and also improve economic benefits.
【作者单位】：南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院;安徽工程大学管理工程学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目(13AZD062) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(NP2016303) 江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYZZ16_0151) 安徽省高校人文社会科学重点研究项目(SK2016A0109)
【分类号】：F273;F812.45

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