公司控制权、经理人员项目选择与交叉持股

发布时间：2018-04-11 05:24

本文选题：控制权 + 项目选择　；参考：《商业研究》2017年08期

【摘要】：随着中国股市步入"全流通"时代,围绕上市公司控制权争夺的案例越来越多,公司管理层通过损害股东利益的方式抵制潜在收购者收购的行为也屡见不鲜。本文通过讨论公司间交叉持股,考察其对公司创始股东、经理人员和可能取得控制权的潜在接管者之间的利益博弈均衡产生的影响。研究发现,如果交叉持股的公司之间存在一个旨在保证公司不会出售其他公司股票的制裁机制,那么交叉持股会使得参与博弈的各方利益均得以提升,公司的经理人员也可以着眼于长远利益,不必为规避潜在收购者的威胁而采取损害公司价值的短视行为。研究结论为交叉持股对公司绩效的影响提供了新的理论证据,即交叉持股有助于经理人员选择增加公司价值的投资项目,从而提升公司绩效和价值。
[Abstract]:As China's stock market enters the era of "full circulation", there are more and more cases surrounding the competition for control of listed companies, and it is common for the management of companies to resist potential acquirers' acquisitions by harming the interests of shareholders.In this paper, the influence of cross-shareholding among firms on the equilibrium of interest game between the founding shareholders, managers and potential takers of control is investigated.The study found that if there is a sanctions regime between cross-shareholding companies to ensure that companies do not sell shares in other companies, cross-shareholdings will enhance the interests of all players involved in the game.Managers can also focus on long-term interests without taking shortsighted actions that undermine the value of the company in order to avoid threats from potential acquirers.The conclusion of the study provides new theoretical evidence for the influence of cross-shareholding on corporate performance, that is, cross-shareholding helps managers to choose investment projects that increase the value of the company, thereby improving the performance and value of the company.
【作者单位】：天津商业大学商学院/管理创新与评价研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年基金项目“公司股权投资下的价值效应与盈余管理研究”,项目编号:12YJC630001 国家自然科学青年基金项目“压力遵从还是享乐驱动?关系情境中群体消费者冲动购买行为的发生机理研究”,项目编号:71602146
【分类号】：F271;F272.92;F832.51

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