碳限额与交易机制下基于成本共担契约的两级供应链协调策略

发布时间：2018-04-11 22:39

本文选题：碳限额与交易机制 + 两级供应链　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年07期

【摘要】：随着碳限额与交易机制在全国范围的推广,研究供应链成员企业协调生产、订货以及碳减排的优化决策已逐渐成为供应链管理领域的热点问题。本文基于一类两级供应链系统,其中制造商为核心企业、供应商为成员企业,采用经济订货批量库存模型,构建了供应链成员企业碳减排的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了理论最优碳减排策略。进一步分析发现,联合决策有助于促进碳减排并提升供应链整体绩效,并且成本共担契约可实现供应链的协调。成本共担契约的可操作性受供应商碳减排技术水平以及产品碳属性的影响。碳减排技术水平高的供应商和低碳产品供应商将拥有更多契约执行选择权。本文研究结果一方面可为碳减排约束下的供应链企业提供决策指导,另一方面也可为政府制定碳减排调控政策提供理论支持。
[Abstract]:With the promotion of carbon quota and trading mechanism in China, the research on coordinated production, ordering and carbon emission reduction of supply chain member enterprises has gradually become a hot issue in the field of supply chain management.Based on a kind of two-level supply chain system, in which the manufacturer is the core enterprise and the supplier is the member enterprise, the Stackelberg game model of carbon emission reduction of supply chain member enterprises is constructed by using the economic order batch inventory model.The optimal carbon emission reduction strategy is obtained.Further analysis shows that the joint decision can promote carbon emission reduction and improve the overall performance of the supply chain, and the cost sharing contract can achieve the coordination of the supply chain.The maneuverability of cost sharing contract is affected by the carbon reduction technology level of suppliers and the carbon attributes of products.Suppliers with high levels of carbon abatement technology and low-carbon product suppliers will have more contract enforcement options.On the one hand, the research results can provide decision guidance for supply chain enterprises under carbon emission reduction constraints, on the other hand, it can also provide theoretical support for the government to formulate carbon emission reduction regulation policy.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学商学院;中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院;
【基金】：北京市自然科学基金资助项目(9162015) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71401195)
【分类号】：F274;X196

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