信息分享、个性化定价与厂商动态竞争分析

发布时间：2018-04-13 06:23

本文选题：信息分享 + 个性化定价　；参考：《产经评论》2017年05期

【摘要】：消费者信息的获得与披露影响厂商的定价行为和消费者的福利,因而应引起社会和政策制定部门的广泛关注。采用寡头竞争模型分析发现,当厂商相互分享消费者的信息时加剧第二期价格竞争,缓和了第一期定价竞争,厂商获得更多利润,但消费者却享有较小的剩余。在单个厂商获得竞争对手消费者的信息时,博弈存在非对称均衡,获得信息的厂商第一期定价更具侵略性,且获得更大利润。当没有厂商提供信息时,博弈存在两个非对称均衡,在均衡中获得更多第一期市场份额的厂商获得更多利润。当厂商进行是否分享消费者信息博弈时,存在两个均衡:相互分享信息和两者都不提供信息。前一个均衡帕累托占优后一个均衡。考察不同均衡的社会福利问题发现,禁止厂商披露消费者信息提高了消费者福利。
[Abstract]:The acquisition and disclosure of consumer information affect the pricing behavior and consumer welfare of manufacturers, so it should be paid more attention to by society and policy-making departments.By using the oligopoly competition model, it is found that when firms share information with each other, the second stage price competition is aggravated, the first stage pricing competition is alleviated, the firm gains more profits, but the consumers enjoy a smaller surplus.When a single firm acquires the information of a competitor's consumers, there is an asymmetric equilibrium in the game, and the first stage pricing is more aggressive and gains more profit.When there is no firm to provide information, there are two asymmetric equilibrium in the game, in which the firm that gets more market share in the first phase gains more profit.When firms play the game of whether to share consumer information, there are two equilibrium: sharing information with each other and neither providing information.The former equilibrium is dominated by Pareto and the latter by Pareto.When examining the social welfare problems of different equilibrium, it is found that the prohibition of manufacturers from disclosing consumer information improves consumer welfare.
【作者单位】：常州工学院经济与管理学院;上海财经大学国际工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于消费者寻求多样化购买行为的企业动态竞争性歧视定价策略研究”(项目编号:71172139,主持人:蒋传海)
【分类号】：F274

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