所有权性质、稳健性与代理成本——基于在职消费的视角

发布时间：2018-04-15 21:11

本文选题：会计稳健性 + 代理成本　；参考：《预测》2017年01期

【摘要】：本文以管理层在职消费为切入点,考察在不同程度的会计稳健性下,上市公司的代理成本受到怎样的影响,并在此基础上分析和检验企业所有权性质对这一关系的调节效应。研究发现:一方面,会计稳健性的增强有助于降低管理层在职消费;另一方面,相比于国有控股公司,会计稳健性降低管理层在职消费的作用在非国有控股公司中更为明显。该结果表明,会计稳健性的增强起到了降低代理成本的积极治理作用,并且这种作用在不同所有权性质的企业里存在显著差异。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the management's in-service consumption as the starting point to investigate how the agency cost of the listed company is affected under the different degree of accounting conservatism, and on this basis to analyze and test the regulatory effect of the nature of the enterprise's ownership on the relationship.It is found that, on the one hand, the enhancement of accounting conservatism helps to reduce the in-service consumption of management; on the other hand, compared with the state-owned holding company, the role of accounting conservatism in reducing the in-service consumption of management is more obvious in non-state-owned holding companies.The results show that the enhancement of accounting conservatism plays an active role in reducing agency cost, and there are significant differences in different ownership enterprises.
【作者单位】：南开大学商学院;海南大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872053) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划重点资助项目(11YJA790004) 海南省自然科学基金资助项目(20157256)
【分类号】：F275

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