企业迎合行为、政府补贴与财务绩效关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-16 23:30

本文选题：政府补贴 + 财务绩效　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在我国既定的市场经济体制下,地方政府在政治职责以及政绩考核体系的触动下,需要通过“看得见的手”来调控地方经济发展,帮助企业并且参与企业的一些活动。其中,政府补贴作为政府这只“有形之手”重要的财政支出之一,也是政府对资源的再分配的手段之一,在以往的国民经济运行调控中起到了重要的作用。但是随着分权化改革的实施,地方政府对地方财政有了更大的自由支配权。因此,这就可能导致地方政府处于自己的某种考虑来对地方企业给予不太合适的政府补贴;于此同时,由于信息的不对称性,上市公司可能洞察到政府发放补贴的动机,而去采取相应的行为去迎合政府的动机,从而获得更多的政府补贴。这样就会导致资源的错配,使资源达不到优化配置,降低资源的使用效率。近几年来,上市公司发放的政府补贴总额度以及覆盖率在不断增加。但是,不同上市公司获得的补贴额却有很大差异。在这样的背景下,企业迎合行为、政府补贴与财务绩效之间的关系就非常具有现实意义。本文主要是基于信息不对称理论以及寻租理论,以沪、深A股上市公司10254个样本为研究对象,试图研究盈利性不同类型的企业采取怎样的行为去获得更多的政府补贴,并且通过实证进一步研究企业迎合行为、政府补贴与财务绩效之间的关系。研究发现:(1)盈利较好的企业倾向采取寻租的方式获得更多的政府补贴;盈利性较差的企业则倾向通过负向盈余操纵来获得政府补贴。(2)对于盈利性较差和盈利较好的企业,政府补贴对当期财务绩效都具有促进作用,但是盈利性较差企业获得政府补贴从长期来看并没有对财务绩效的提高起到促进作用;(3)对于盈利性较好的企业,通过寻租获得的政府补贴弱化了政府补贴对企业财务绩效的影响;但是对于盈利性较差的企业,其通过负向盈余操纵获得的政府补贴是否弱化政府补贴对企业财务绩效促进作用有一定的不确定性。为此,本文从政府以及企业角度分别提出了相关建议。
[Abstract]:Under the established market economy system of our country, the local government should regulate the local economic development through "visible hand", help the enterprise and participate in some activities of the enterprise under the touch of political duty and achievement appraisal system.Among them, government subsidy, as one of the important fiscal expenditure of the "tangible hand" of the government, is also one of the means of the government's redistribution of resources, which has played an important role in the regulation and control of the operation of the national economy in the past.But with the implementation of decentralization reform, local governments have more free control over local finance.Therefore, this may lead local governments to give inappropriate government subsidies to local enterprises on their own account; at the same time, because of the asymmetry of information, listed companies may have insight into the motivation of government subsidies.And to take appropriate actions to meet the government's motives, thereby obtaining more government subsidies.This will lead to the mismatch of resources, so that the resources can not achieve optimal allocation, and reduce the efficiency of resource use.In recent years, the total amount and coverage of government subsidies issued by listed companies have been increasing.However, the amount of subsidies received by different listed companies is very different.Under this background, the relationship between government subsidy and financial performance is of practical significance.This paper is mainly based on information asymmetry theory and rent-seeking theory, taking 10254 samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as research objects, trying to study the behavior of different types of for-profit enterprises to obtain more government subsidies.And through empirical research on the relationship between enterprise pandering behavior, government subsidy and financial performance.The study found that the better-profitable enterprises tend to get more government subsidies in the form of rent-seeking, while the less profitable enterprises tend to obtain government subsidies through negative earnings manipulation.Government subsidies can promote the current financial performance, but in the long run, the government subsidies for the less profitable enterprises do not promote the improvement of the financial performance.Government subsidies obtained through rent-seeking have weakened the impact of government subsidies on corporate financial performance; but for less profitable firms,Whether the government subsidies obtained through negative earnings manipulation can weaken the role of government subsidies in promoting the financial performance of enterprises is uncertain.For this reason, this text from the angle of government and enterprise put forward the relevant suggestion separately.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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