独立董事否定意见发表与换届未连任

发布时间：2018-04-18 10:45

本文选题：独立董事 + 连任　；参考：《金融研究》2016年12期

【摘要】：在公司治理实践中,对董事会议案出具否定性意见是独立董事履行监督职能最具代表性的行为,而换届未连任是我国制度背景和文化特质下更为真实的独董离职方式。利用我国上市公司独立董事对议案发表意见的独特数据,本文从否定意见的具体类型、董事会议案事项、是否集体行动等三个方面实证考察了对董事会议案说"不"与独董未来是否在第一任期结束后实现连任之间的关系。研究发现,在我国公司治理实践中,出具否定意见的方式(委婉或直接、集体或单独)有时比否定意见本身更加重要;即使同样是否定性意见,但如果针对的董事会议案事项不同,独董未来连任的可能性也不同。一般而言,明确出具反对意见的,针对内部人的反对事项以及集体说不的独董未来连任的可能性更低,因而独董所预期的公司治理角色由于上述"逆淘汰"机制和"任人唯亲"的董事会文化的存在而大打折扣。本文的研究提示,应该为独董出具否定性意见的相关法律风险提供更加明确的指引,避免政策模糊地带,将有利于独董更好地履行监督职能。
[Abstract]:In the practice of corporate governance, it is the most representative behavior for independent directors to issue negative opinions to the board of directors to perform their supervisory functions, while the non-reelection is a more real way for independent directors to leave their posts under the background of the system and the cultural characteristics of our country.Based on the unique data of independent directors' opinions on the motion of listed companies in China, this paper discusses the specific types of negative opinions, the issues of board motions,The relationship between saying "no" to the board motion and whether Dong Dong will be re-elected after the end of the first term is examined empirically in three aspects, whether collective action or not.The study found that in the practice of corporate governance in China, the way of issuing negative opinions (euphemism or direct, collective or individual) is sometimes more important than negative opinions themselves;But if the board of directors bill is different, sole Dong in the future re-election possibility is also different.In general, those who explicitly issue objections are less likely to be re-elected in the future against the objections of insiders and the collective saying that Dong is the only one who will be re-elected in the future.As a result, the role of corporate governance expected by Dou Dong is greatly reduced by the existence of the "anti-elimination" mechanism and the "cronyism" of the board culture.The research in this paper suggests that we should provide more clear guidance for Dou Dong to issue negative opinions on the relevant legal risks and avoid the ambiguity of policies which will help him to perform his supervisory function better.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学财政金融学院/中国财政金融政策研究中心;河北金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然基金面上项目“独立董事激励机制的影响因素和激励效果-来自我国上市公司的证据”(项目批准号:71272159)和面上项目“任人唯亲的董事会文化与独立董事更迭的‘逆淘汰’”(项目批准号:71472177) 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”对本项研究的资助
【分类号】：F271

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