经理人权力与员工工资——来自五百家非上市公司的证据

发布时间：2018-04-20 09:42

本文选题：经理人权力 + 员工工资　；参考：《学术月刊》2017年03期

【摘要】：有权力的经理人会支付给员工更高还是更低的工资?现有的几种主流的委托代理理论给出了完全不同的预测。本文提出,一个有权力的经理人对待员工的态度取决于他在追逐哪一类的私人收益,而后者进一步取决于劳动力保护等外部环境和大股东监督力度等内部治理结构。本文提出四个具体的假说,并使用一套中国非上市公司的数据来检验。实证分析发现:若总经理的权力大于最大的股东,则企业支付给蓝领和白领工人的工资都更低。通过对中国劳动力市场和产品市场以及非上市公司的特征的描述,本文认为,在这样的环境下,有权力的经理人有着很强的动机来通过削减员工工资以增强短期内的业绩。此外,有些因素会显著地影响经理人削减工资的幅度,包括:企业内部劳工的力量以及所在区域的劳动保护程度、内部公司治理结构、外部产品市场的竞争程度,以及企业更关注于长期还是短期的发展。
[Abstract]:Will powerful managers pay employees higher or lower wages? The existing principal-agent theory gives a completely different prediction. This paper suggests that the attitude of a powerful manager towards employees depends on what kind of private benefits he is chasing, while the latter is further determined by external environments such as labor protection and internal governance structures such as the degree of supervision by large shareholders. This paper presents four hypotheses and uses a set of data of Chinese non-listed companies to test them. The empirical analysis shows that if the power of the general manager is greater than that of the largest shareholder, the wages paid to both blue-collar and white-collar workers are lower. By describing the characteristics of China's labor market, product market and non-listed companies, this paper argues that, in such an environment, powerful managers have a strong incentive to increase short-term performance by cutting employee wages. In addition, there are some factors that have a significant impact on the extent to which managers cut wages, including the strength of workers in the enterprise and the degree of labour protection in the region, the internal corporate governance structure, and the degree of competition in the external product market, And the enterprise pays more attention to the long-term or short-term development.
【作者单位】：同济大学经济与管理学院;上海财经大学法学院;上海立信会计金融学院国际经贸学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“企业改制、公司治理与员工福利”(71402123) 国家社科基金重大项目“创造有利于制造业发展的竞争环境研究”(15ZDA027)和“推动中国经济持续健康发展的基本要求、根本途径和政策选择研究”(13&ZD015)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F272.91;F272.92

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