我国金融企业高管薪酬对企业绩效影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 09:28

本文选题：金融企业 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：2008年源于美国的金融危机席卷全球,造成全球范围内金融资产价格下落、金融机构破产、经济衰退等一系列恶性连锁反应。除美国政府对金融机构监管的缺失及金融机构内部风险防控机制的薄弱外,金融企业高管激进的薪酬激励机制也是造成危机的重要原因之一。危机过后各国政府纷纷出台相关政策对金融企业高管薪酬加强监管。薪酬激励尤其是对高管人员的薪酬激励已成为金融企业内部治理的重要组成部分,大多数企业将经营绩效作为考察薪酬激励效果的重要参考因素,因此研究金融企业高管薪酬对企业绩效的影响作用成为企业内部治理研究中十分有意义的研究课题。本文首先对企业高管薪酬与绩效的关联性进行文献研究,并对我国金融企业高管薪酬现状进行分析。接着文章选取我国45家上市金融企业2009年至2015年高管薪酬及绩效数据,运用多元面板回归模型对我国金融上市企业高管薪酬与综合绩效之间的关联关系做实证研究。研究表明,我国金融企业高管薪酬及管理层持股比例与企业综合经营绩效水平间具有显著的正向相关关系,高管人员与普通员工之间的薪酬差距对企业绩效水平存在负向影响。最后文章根据理论研究与实证研究结果对我国金融企业现有薪酬激励机制提出可能的政策建议,以促进国内金融企业经营绩效水平的提升,推动我国金融业的持续稳健发展。
[Abstract]:The financial crisis that originated in the United States in 2008 swept the world, causing a series of vicious chain effects such as the fall of financial asset prices worldwide, the bankruptcy of financial institutions and the economic recession. In addition to the lack of government supervision over financial institutions and the weakness of internal risk prevention and control mechanism of financial institutions, the radical compensation incentive mechanism of financial enterprise executives is also one of the important reasons for the crisis. After the crisis, governments have introduced policies to strengthen the supervision of executive compensation in financial enterprises. Compensation incentive, especially for senior managers, has become an important part of the internal governance of financial enterprises. Most enterprises take operating performance as an important reference factor to evaluate the effect of compensation incentives. Therefore, the study of the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance has become a very meaningful research topic in the study of corporate governance. In this paper, the relationship between executive compensation and performance is studied, and the current situation of executive compensation in financial enterprises in China is analyzed. Then the paper selects the data of executive compensation and performance of 45 listed financial enterprises in China from 2009 to 2015 and makes an empirical study on the relationship between executive compensation and comprehensive performance of Chinese financial listed enterprises by using multiple panel regression model. The study shows that there is a significant positive correlation between the executive compensation and the proportion of managerial shareholding in financial enterprises and the level of comprehensive management performance. The pay gap between executives and ordinary employees has a negative impact on the performance level of enterprises. Finally, according to the results of theoretical and empirical studies, this paper puts forward some possible policy recommendations on the current salary incentive mechanism of financial enterprises in China, in order to promote the improvement of the performance level of domestic financial enterprises and promote the sustained and steady development of the financial industry in China.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.39

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