供应不可靠环境下供应链契约设计

发布时间：2018-04-29 10:55

本文选题：供应中断 + 双源采购　；参考：《烟台大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：经济全球化的发展使得市场竞争环境日益复杂,供应链中的不确定因素越来越多,各种突发事件频发,加剧了供应中断的风险;加之供应链各成员之间私人信息不共享,导致市场失灵,供应链运作低效。市场各种弊端的诉求使得缓解中断风险、信息共享迫在眉睫。本文对上述出现的供应链问题分两部分加以论述,首先采用双源采购策略来缓解供应中断风险,假定供应可靠性信息已知,研究由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计,考虑部分中断和完全中断两种类型的供应商,将部分中断供应商作为主供应商,完全中断供应商作为次供应商,建立双源采购的供应链契约设计模型,运用逆序解法,得到供应商的最优生产规模和制造商的最优契约设计,并分析当供应商面临双源采购时的签约决策及订货策略。然后考虑信息不对称问题,假定市场中存在高可靠性和低可靠性两种类型的供应商,且供应商可靠性为其私人信息,市场需求服从随机分布。制造商提供一组契约包括四个决策变量:固定支付、变动支付、订货量和惩罚成本,供应商根据契约内容决定自己的最优生产规模。然后建立动态规划模型,运用显示原理,研究在信息对称和不对称两种情况下制造商的契约设计和供应商的生产决策,最后分析供应商可靠性的信息价值。研究结果表明:供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关,与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关;制造商的订货量与供应商的可靠性呈正相关;供应商的惩罚成本与自身可靠性呈负相关。不论信息是否共享,制造商对高可靠性供应商的订货量都大于对低可靠性供应商的订货量,且信息价值随着两种供应商的可靠性水平之差的增大而增大,随着高可靠性供应商在市场中所占比例的增大而增大,随着低可靠性供应商在市场中所占比例的增大而减小。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization, the market competition environment is becoming more and more complex, the uncertain factors in supply chain are more and more, and various kinds of unexpected events frequently occur, which aggravate the risk of supply interruption; in addition, private information is not shared among members of supply chain. Lead to market failure, supply chain operation is inefficient. All kinds of malpractices in the market make it urgent to reduce the risk of interruption and share information. In this paper, the supply chain problems mentioned above are discussed in two parts. Firstly, dual-source purchasing strategy is used to mitigate the supply interruption risk, assuming that the supply reliability information is known. This paper studies the design of a two-level supply chain contract consisting of one manufacturer and two suppliers, considering two types of suppliers: partial interruption and complete interruption. The partial interrupt supplier is regarded as the main supplier and the complete interrupt supplier as the secondary supplier. The supply chain contract design model of dual-source purchasing is established. The optimal production scale of supplier and the optimal contract design of manufacturer are obtained by using reverse order method. The contract decision and ordering strategy are analyzed when the supplier is faced with dual-source purchase. Then considering the problem of information asymmetry, it is assumed that there are two types of suppliers in the market with high reliability and low reliability, and the supplier reliability is its private information, and the market demand is randomly distributed. The manufacturer provides a set of contracts with four decision variables: fixed payment, variable payment, order quantity and penalty cost, and suppliers determine their optimal production scale according to the content of the contract. Then the dynamic programming model is established and the information value of supplier reliability is analyzed by using the display principle to study the contract design of the manufacturer and the production decision of the supplier under the condition of information symmetry and asymmetry. The results show that the optimal production scale of the supplier is negatively correlated with the unit production cost of the product, positively correlated with the unit variable payment and unit penalty cost, and the order quantity of the manufacturer is positively correlated with the reliability of the supplier. The penalty cost of suppliers is negatively correlated with their own reliability. Regardless of whether the information is shared or not, the manufacturer's order volume for high reliability suppliers is greater than for low reliability suppliers, and the value of information increases with the increase of the difference between the two suppliers' reliability levels. With the increase of the proportion of high reliability suppliers in the market, the proportion of low reliability suppliers in the market increases and decreases.
【学位授予单位】：烟台大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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