谈判优势、控制权收益与大股东初始持股比例——来自中国865家村镇银行的经验证据

发布时间：2018-05-02 04:22

本文选题：谈判优势 + 控制权收益　；参考：《财贸经济》2017年02期

【摘要】：本文针对"主发起行制度"下,村镇银行大股东初始持股比例的现实差异和既有研究不足,基于公司治理理论和博弈分析思路,引入拓展的纳什谈判模型,从谈判优势和控制权收益相结合的视角,构建解释大股东初始持股比例形成机制的理论模型,进而运用中国865家村镇银行的数据,实证检验理论模型推论与假说发现:村镇银行创立阶段,大股东具有利用谈判优势,提高初始持股比例的倾向;控制权收益增加,对其具有抑制作用,且大股东谈判优势越强,这种抑制作用越明显,但并不会改变大股东追求较高初始持股比例的基本趋势。然而,从村镇银行发展角度出发,大股东应降低初始持股比例,尤其是在控制权收益较高、谈判优势较低情况下,更应如此,至少不应超出其所拥有的谈判优势。本文不仅直接支持了调低村镇银行大股东初始持股比例的政策,提出了完善我国村镇银行股权结构的对策建议,而且创新了公司股权结构形成机制研究视角,完善和深化了既有研究。
[Abstract]:This paper aims at the actual difference of the initial shareholding ratio of the major shareholders of the village bank and the deficiency of the existing research under the "main initiating bank system". Based on the theory of corporate governance and the thinking of game analysis, this paper introduces the extended Nash negotiation model. From the point of view of the combination of negotiation advantage and profit of control right, this paper constructs a theoretical model to explain the formation mechanism of the initial shareholding ratio of large shareholders, and then uses the data of 865 village banks in China. Empirical testing theoretical model inference and hypothesis found that: at the founding stage of village bank, the major shareholders have the tendency to use the negotiation advantage to improve the initial shareholding ratio; the increase of the income of control control has the inhibitory effect to it, and the stronger the negotiation advantage of the large shareholders is. The more obvious this inhibition is, the more it will not change the basic trend of large shareholders pursuing higher initial shareholding ratio. However, from the perspective of the development of village banks, the majority shareholders should reduce the initial shareholding ratio, especially in the case of higher profit of control rights and lower bargaining advantages, at least not exceeding the bargaining advantages they possess. This paper not only directly supports the policy of reducing the initial shareholding ratio of the major shareholders of village banks, but also puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to improve the ownership structure of village banks in China, and also innovates the perspective of research on the formation mechanism of corporate equity structure. Improve and deepen the existing research.
【作者单位】：云南财经大学金融学院;宁波大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71273144) 国家社会科学基金项目(16CJY073) 浙江省自然科学基金项目(LQ16G030002)的资助
【分类号】：F271;F832.35

【相似文献】