两职结构改变对管理层两类代理成本的影响分析

发布时间：2018-05-09 07:22

本文选题：两职结构改变 + 直接代理成本　；参考：《当代财经》2017年09期

【摘要】：两职结构的科学设置及如何降低管理层代理成本,历来是会计理论界研究的热点问题。运用2010—2014年间的A股上市公司样本数据,考察了两职结构改变对管理层直接代理成本和间接代理成本的影响,以及法治水平对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现:两职结构的分权式改变显著降低了管理层的直接代理成本和间接代理成本;两职结构的集权式改变显著增加了管理层的直接代理成本,不影响管理层的间接代理成本。进一步的分析发现,两职结构的分权式改变对管理层直接代理成本和间接代理成本的影响只在法治水平较低地区的企业中起作用,即法治水平越低,两职结构的分权式改变对管理层两类代理成本的影响越大;但法治水平不影响两职结构的集权式改变与管理层两类代理成本的关系。
[Abstract]:How to set up the two-position structure scientifically and how to reduce the cost of management agency has always been a hot issue in the field of accounting theory. Based on the sample data of A-share listed companies from 2010-2014, this paper investigates the influence of the change of two-position structure on the direct agency cost and indirect agency cost of management, as well as the regulative effect of the level of rule of law on the relationship between them. It is found that the decentralization of the two-position structure significantly reduces the direct agency cost and the indirect agency cost of the management, and the centralization of the two-position structure increases the direct agency cost of the management. It does not affect the indirect agency cost of management. Further analysis shows that the effect of the decentralization of the two-position structure on the direct and indirect agency costs of the management only plays a role in the enterprises with a lower level of rule of law, that is, the lower the level of the rule of law, the lower the level of the rule of law. The change of separation of power in the two-position structure has a greater impact on the two types of agency cost of management, but the level of rule of law does not affect the relationship between the centralized change of the two-position structure and the two types of agency cost of management.
【作者单位】：江西财经大学会计发展研究中心/会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71562014)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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