规模经济的差异化竞争制造商集团采购的权力结构模型

发布时间：2018-06-05 23:57

本文选题：集团采购 + 权力结构　；参考：《管理工程学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：针对由一个集团采购组织(GPO)和两个差异化竞争制造商组成的集团采购供应链,考虑GPO以批量折扣价格集中采购某种部件,并以转移价格提供给制造商,然后各制造商分别将其加工为一种差异化替代产品。分别构建了集中决策下的基准模型,以及分别由GPO和制造商主导的两种权力结构博弈模型,并得到唯一均衡解。进而分析了权力结构、产品差异化、规模经济性等因素对均衡结果的影响,最后从供应链视角提出了两种权力结构在不同环境下的适用性和演化路径,并用数值算例予以考察。研究发现:集中决策下的最优产量和系统利润均随规模经济性呈单峰变化,分散决策在规模经济性足够高时可达最优;制造商主导的系统利润在规模经济性较低时高于GPO主导,而在规模经济性较高且产品差异化较大时低于GPO主导;制造商主导时可能无法实施集团采购,并且,当产品差异化较小时,还可能对制造商不利,而对GPO和系统有利。
[Abstract]:For a group procurement supply chain consisting of a group procurement organization (GPO) and two differentiated competitive manufacturers, consider GPO centralizing the purchase of a component at a bulk discount price and providing it to the manufacturer at a transfer price. Each manufacturer then processes it into a differentiated alternative product. The benchmark model under centralized decision and the two power structure game models led by GPO and manufacturer respectively are constructed, and the unique equilibrium solution is obtained. Then it analyzes the influence of power structure, product differentiation and economies of scale on the equilibrium results. Finally, from the perspective of supply chain, the applicability and evolution path of the two power structures in different environments are put forward, and the numerical examples are used to investigate them. It is found that the optimal output and system profit under centralized decision have a single peak variation with economies of scale, and decentralized decisions can reach optimal results when economies of scale are high enough, while system profits led by manufacturers are higher than those dominated by GPO when economies of scale are low. But when the scale economy is high and the product differentiation is larger, it is lower than the GPO leading; the manufacturer may not be able to implement group purchasing when leading, and when the product differentiation is small, it may be disadvantageous to the manufacturer, but beneficial to the GPO and the system.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆大学工商管理与经济发展研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086) 国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2012BAF12B09)
【分类号】：F274

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