银行背景董事在可转债融资中的作用

发布时间：2018-06-06 15:26

本文选题：银行背景董事 + 可转债　；参考：《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2017年02期

【摘要】：银行背景董事在全球资本市场中是一个普遍存在的现象。银行背景董事是否影响公司的可转债融资,特别是在可转债的融资审核过程中,银行董事是否发挥积极的作用,这是一个尚待深入研究的问题。基于我国特有的融资环境,可使用2003—2012年进行可转债融资申请的上市公司数据,考察银行背景董事在公司可转债融资中发挥的作用。研究发现,大约26%的申请公司具有银行从业背景的董事,而银行背景董事在公司的可转债融资申请中发挥了积极的作用,提高了被证监会审核通过的可能性。但是,这一作用仅在金融发展程度低的地区得到体现,并且主要表现为银行背景董事的"专家"作用,而非"信号"作用。这表明银行背景董事的作用,不但受到公司所在地区的金融发展程度的影响,而且发挥的途径有限。
[Abstract]:The bank background director is a universal phenomenon in the global capital market. Whether the background directors of banks influence the financing of convertible bonds, especially in the process of the financing audit of convertible bonds, whether the directors of banks play an active role, this is a question to be further studied. Based on the unique financing environment in China, the data of listed companies applying for convertible bond financing from 2003 to 2012 can be used to investigate the role of bank background directors in corporate convertible bond financing. It is found that about 26% of the applicant companies have directors with banking background, and bank background directors play an active role in the company's convertible bond financing application, which improves the possibility of approval by the CSRC. However, this role is only reflected in the low level of financial development in the region, and mainly reflected in the bank background director "expert" role, rather than "signal" role. This indicates that the role of bank background directors is not only affected by the degree of financial development in the region where the company is located, but also by limited means.
【作者单位】：四川大学商学院;
【基金】：中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目“应计与真实盈余管理对股价暴跌风险的影响及其治理研究”(SKQY201650) 四川省社科规划项目“新常态下上市公司盈余管理的审计风险治理研究”(SC15B041) 国家自然科学基金项目“应计与真实盈余管理对审计意见监管有用性的影响机理及其经济后果研究”(71302132);国家自然科学基金项目“信息生态环境与企业内部控制有效性问题研究”(71332008)
【分类号】：F271

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