基于碳排放的闭环供应链政府奖惩机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-09 03:52

本文选题：奖惩机制 + 闭环供应链　；参考：《工业技术经济》2017年12期

【摘要】：温室气体的排放问题已成为国际社会亟待解决的问题,解决这一问题的必由之路就是通过降低产品碳排量实现从源头上减排。本文研究由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的逆向供应链系统,建立了政府实施回收奖惩机制的动态博弈模型,比较分析了有无政府回收奖惩机制两种情形下零售商的回收比例、供应链参与方的期望利润和产品的碳排放总量。研究结果表明,政府回收奖惩机制提高了回收比例和碳减排水平;当再制造减排程度较小时,政府回收奖惩机制降低了碳排放总量;基于消费者低碳偏好的政府回收奖惩机制提高了制造商和零售商的利润,更大程度的降低了产品总碳排放量;政府回收奖惩机制下较小的目标回收率能够最大化零售商利润。
[Abstract]:The problem of greenhouse gas emission has become an urgent problem to be solved by the international community. The only way to solve this problem is to reduce the carbon emissions of products from the source. In this paper, a reverse supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is studied, and a dynamic game model is established for the government to implement the reward and punishment mechanism of recovery. Expected profit of supply chain participants and total carbon emissions from products. The results show that the reward and punishment mechanism of government recovery increases the recovery ratio and carbon emission reduction level, and when the degree of remanufacturing emission reduction is small, the government recovery reward and punishment mechanism reduces the total amount of carbon emissions. The reward and punishment mechanism based on consumers' low carbon preference increases the profits of manufacturers and retailers, and reduces the total carbon emissions of products to a greater extent.
【作者单位】：烟台大学经济管理学院;大连理工大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：教育部人文社科基金规划项目“基于供应中断的供应链协调机制研究”(项目编号:17YJA630046) 国家社科基金项目“基于供应商产能的供应应急策略与设计研究”(项目编号:12CGL042) 国家自然科学基金项目“以DC为中枢的农产品冷链库存策略与多温共配优化研究”(项目编号:71372122);国家自然科学基金项目“交易契约视角下基于平台运作的创新授权优化研究”(项目编号:71402158)
【分类号】：F274;F812.4;X321

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