技术入股型产学研合作创新的利益分配研究——基于技术价值不确定性的新视角

发布时间：2018-06-11 18:53

本文选题：产学研合作创新 + 利益分配　；参考：《软科学》2017年10期

【摘要】：在传统产学研合作委托代理模型中引入技术价值变量,并尝试运用再谈判机制和控制权配置理论,揭示出技术价值不确定性情况下的最优利益分配机制。结论显示,合理配置控制权的再谈判可增加合作剩余,而控制权的配置取决于初始谈判力与努力的产出弹性的关系以及谈判力受技术价值影响的程度;一般情况下,初始谈判力弱的一方拥有控制权更利于增大企业价值。
[Abstract]:With the introduction of technical value variables in the traditional agency model of the cooperation and research cooperation, we try to use the re negotiation mechanism and the control right allocation theory to reveal the optimal benefit allocation mechanism under the uncertainty of technical value. The conclusion shows that the re negotiation of the reasonable allocation of control rights can increase the cooperation surplus, and the allocation of control rights depends on the initial value. The relationship between the bargaining power and the output elasticity of the effort and the extent to which the bargaining power is influenced by the technical value; in general, the ownership of a party with weak initial bargaining power is more conducive to increasing the value of the enterprise.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71172100) 国家软科学研究计划项目(2014GXS4D135)
【分类号】：F273.1

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