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承销商声誉、IPO盈余管理与公司业绩

发布时间:2018-06-13 12:33

  本文选题:承销商声誉 + IPO ; 参考:《南京大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:在我国,由于经济发展阶段原因,资本市场为政府所主导,行政管制色彩浓厚。由于资源的供给稀缺,为了达到上市的标准,并且尽可能提高发行价,拟上市企业有较强的动机粉饰财务报表。企业上市要聘请专业的承销商、会计师事务所和律师事务所,承销商在企业上市过程中对提高信息披露质量,促进资源配置发挥着独特而不可替代的作用。承销商利用其专业信息生产能力并发挥"第三方认证中介"作用,提高了市场的运行效率。然而,承销商并没有完全解决作为"信息生产者"可靠性的问题,一方面发行企业财务包装手段精明,券商尽职调查可能没有能够识别;另一方面,承销商也存在为了尽快发行,拿到承销费用,与发行人合谋造假的情形。在这种情况下,不良记录的承销商会失去投资者的信任,高声誉券商的价值便会凸显出来。国外现有研究证实承销商声誉机制的存在,承销商声誉与盈余管理负相关,高声誉承销商辅导的企业发行抑价更低,长期回报率更高。在我国承销商声誉机制是否已经发挥开始发挥作用?本文将对此进行研究论证,以期获得实证检验的证据。本文首先从文献综述和理论分析提出研究假设,然后选取2007-2014年上市的公司作为样本,按照M-W法采用承销金额份额和承销家数份额加权综合作为承销商声誉的解释变量,选择修正的琼斯模型计算应计盈余管理,综合使用描述性统计、相关性分析及多元回归分析检验假设。本文通过实证研究发现,在中小板市场,承销商声誉能够显著抑制企业的盈余管理,承销商声誉与企业质量的甄选机制也已初步显著。这表明承销商声誉机制在中小板已初步建立。此外,本文研究了承销商声誉发挥的约束条件,研究发现竞争性行业、市场化进程较高、内部控制较好的样本组承销商声誉更能有效发挥作用,更能有效抑制企业的盈余管理。
[Abstract]:In our country, because of the economic development stage, the capital market is dominated by the government, and the color of administrative control is strong. Because the supply of resources is scarce, in order to reach the standard of listing and raise the issuing price as much as possible, the listed enterprises have strong motivation to whitewash the financial statements. The listed enterprises should employ professional underwriters, accounting firms and law firms. Underwriters play a unique and irreplaceable role in improving the quality of information disclosure and promoting the allocation of resources in the process of listing. The underwriters use their professional information production capacity and play the role of "third-party certification intermediary" to improve the efficiency of the market. However, underwriters do not fully address the issue of reliability as "information producers". On the one hand, issuing enterprises' financial packaging means shrewdly, securities firms may not be able to identify due diligence; on the other hand, The underwriter also exists in order to issue as soon as possible, get underwriting fee, conspire with the issuer to cheat. In this case, underwriters with bad records lose the trust of investors and the value of reputable brokerages highlights. Existing studies abroad confirm the existence of underwriter reputation mechanism. Underwriter reputation is negatively correlated with earnings management. The underpricing of high reputation underwriter tutors is lower and the long-term rate of return is higher. Does the underwriter reputation mechanism in our country have begun to play a role? This article will carry on the research demonstration to obtain the evidence of the empirical test. This paper first puts forward the research hypothesis from literature review and theoretical analysis, then selects the listed companies from 2007-2014 as the sample, and adopts the weighted synthesis of the underwriting amount share and the underwriting family share as the explanatory variable of the underwriter's reputation according to M-W method. The modified Jones model is used to calculate the accrual earnings management, and descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multivariate regression analysis are used to test the hypothesis. Through empirical research, it is found that in small and medium-sized market, underwriter reputation can significantly inhibit earnings management, and the selection mechanism of underwriter reputation and enterprise quality is also preliminary significant. This indicates that the underwriter reputation mechanism in the small and medium board has been initially established. In addition, this paper studies the constraints of underwriter reputation. It is found that in competitive industry, the market-oriented process is higher, the sample group with better internal control can play a more effective role, and can effectively restrain the earnings management of the enterprise.
【学位授予单位】:南京大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F275;F832.51


本文编号:2014040

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