财税优惠、高管薪酬对公司研发投资的协同效应研究

发布时间：2018-06-15 08:22

本文选题：研发投资 + 高管年薪　；参考：《郑州航空工业管理学院》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在知识经济时代的今天,创新是企业在激烈的市场竞争中立足的重要保障,研发投资是创新的核心环节。近年来,我国研发投资强度不断增强,但是与发达国家相比还相差甚远,这一现象已成为制约我国经济“创新驱动”战略转型和提升国家综合实力的重要因素之一。如何破解公司研发投资不足难题,学术界主要从财税优惠和高管薪酬两方面展开了研究。目前关于财税优惠和高管薪酬对研发投资的影响研究主要集中在单要素研究层面,缺乏系统的、深层次的分析。由于影响公司研发投资问题是一个复杂的系统问题,而非单要素的简单加和,基于此,本文将高管薪酬、财税优惠与研发投资纳入同一分析框架,从系统层面运用系统论的协同效应深入探讨高管薪酬和财税优惠对公司研发投资的协同效应,不仅进一步扩大了研究范围,而且为提升公司研发投资提供了新的视角。为检验高管薪酬和财税优惠对公司研发投资的协同效应,采用规范研究法和实证研究法,选取2010—2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本进行实证检验。研究发现:第一,总体上,高管年薪显著促进公司研发投资,持股比例与研发投资呈显著的倒U型关系;高管股权激励对提升研发投资的激励效果比年薪更好;对于国有企业,高管年薪和持股比例均能够显著促进研发投资;对于民营企业,高管年薪不能有效提升研发投资,持股比例只有在0~36.44%范围内时显著促进研发投资。第二,政府补贴和优惠税率均能够显著提升不同所有权性质企业研发投资,但优惠税率的激励效果更好。第三,政府补贴与优惠税率的交互项、高管年薪与政府补贴和优惠税率的交互项对不同所有权性质企业研发投资均具有显著的协同效应,高管持股比例只有在0~36.44%范围内时与高管年薪、政府补贴和优惠税率的交互项对不同所有权性质企业研发投资具有显著的协同效应。针对研究结论,本文从企业和政府两个层面提出对策建议。企业层面,合理设计高管薪酬结构,以股权激励为主导方向。政府层面,政府补贴与税收优惠相结合,以税收优惠为主导方向;调整政府补贴在不同所有权性质企业间的比重。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, innovation is the important guarantee for enterprises to stand in the fierce market competition. Research and development investment is the core of innovation. In recent years, the intensity of R & D investment in China has been increasing, but it is far from the developed countries. This phenomenon has become a strategic transformation of "innovation driven" in China's economy. One of the important factors to promote the comprehensive strength of the country. How to solve the problem of the lack of R & D investment in the company, the academic circle mainly studies the two aspects of the financial and tax incentives and executive compensation. At present, the research on the impact of financial and tax incentives and executive compensation on R & D investment is mainly focused on the single factor research level, which lacks systematic and deep analysis. Because the problem of R & D investment is a complex system problem, rather than the simple addition of single factor, based on this, this paper puts the executive compensation, financial and tax incentives and R & D investment into the same analysis framework, and uses systematic synergy effect to explore the synergy effect of executive compensation and tax incentives on R & D investment. It not only further expands the scope of research, but also provides a new perspective for the promotion of R & D investment in the company. In order to test the synergy effect of executive compensation and financial and tax incentives on R & D investment, it adopts the normative research method and empirical research method, and selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies for the empirical test from 2010 to 2015. First, on the whole, the annual salary of senior executives significantly promotes the company's R & D investment, the proportion of shareholding and R & D investment has a significant inverted U relationship, and the incentive effect of executive equity incentive is better than the annual salary for the promotion of R & D investment; for the state-owned enterprises, the annual salary and the share ratio of senior executives can significantly promote R & D investment; for private enterprises, the senior executives are not paid a salary. It can promote R & D investment effectively. The proportion of shareholding can only promote R & D investment significantly only in the range of 0~36.44%. Second, government subsidies and preferential tax rates can significantly improve the R & D investment of different ownership enterprises, but the incentive effect of preferential tax rate is better. Third, the interaction of government subsidy and preferential tax rate, senior executive salary and government subsidy The interaction between the preferential tax rate and the preferential tax rate has significant synergy effect on the R & D investment of different ownership enterprises. The proportion of the executive stock is only within the range of 0~36.44% and the annual salary of the executive. The interaction of government subsidy and preferential tax rate has significant synergistic effect on the enterprise R & D investment with different ownership properties. From the two levels of the enterprise and the government, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions. The enterprise level, the rational design of executive compensation structure, with equity incentive as the leading direction. The government level, the government subsidies and tax incentives combined, tax preference as the dominant direction, adjustment of the proportion of government subsidies in different ownership of enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：郑州航空工业管理学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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