供应商技术研发决策行为的演化博弈分析——基于技术外部性的视角

发布时间：2018-06-18 11:51

本文选题：共性技术 + 专用技术　；参考：《工业技术经济》2017年02期

【摘要】：供应商在面向多制造商时研发共性技术还是研发专用技术?以此问题为基点,本文运用演化博弈论,在共性技术外部性、外部性引发价格战及政府干预治理情形下对供应商技术研发决策行为进行分析。研究发现:共性技术外部性的存在使得博弈演化稳定于由选择不同技术研发策略的供应商共存的均衡;在外部性引发价格战情形下,当外部性较强时,零部件降价幅度越大,供应商越倾向于选择研发专用技术,反之,当外部性较弱时供应商越倾向于选择研发共性技术;当考虑外部干预治理时,政府价格干预效果依该行为所引致的市场额外需求降低状况,而政府补偿干预有效引导着供应商选择共性技术研发策略。
[Abstract]:Do suppliers develop common technologies or specialized technologies when facing multiple manufacturers? Based on this problem, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the decision-making behavior of supplier technology R & D under the circumstances of common technology externality, externality triggering price war and government intervention. It is found that the existence of common technology externalities makes the evolution of game stable in the equilibrium of coexistence of suppliers who choose different technology and R & D strategies. In the case of price war caused by externality, when externality is strong, the price reduction of components increases. The more suppliers tend to choose special technologies for R & D, on the other hand, when externalities are weak, suppliers are more inclined to choose common technologies of R & D; when external intervention governance is considered, The effect of government price intervention is based on the reduction of market extra demand caused by this behavior, while government compensation intervention effectively guides suppliers to choose common technology research and development strategy.
【作者单位】：重庆工商大学;
【基金】：重庆市教委科学技术研究项目“制造业企业共性技术合作创新与扩散机制研究”(项目编号:KJ1600632) 国家自然科学基金青年项目“知识服务机构联结多样化与制造企业服务创新绩效关系研究:双元搜索的视角”(项目编号:71603033) 重庆市高校创新团队建设计划资助项目“家族企业成长与区域经济发展”(项目编号:CXTDX201601027)
【分类号】：F273.1

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