管理层权力、机构投资者异质性与资本配置效率

发布时间：2023-03-01 17:14

本文选题：管理层权力 + 机构投资者异质性　；参考：《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》2017年01期

【摘要】：基于我国沪、深A股2010年至2014年上市公司数据,从机构投资者异质性视角,实证检验了管理层权力与资本配置效率的关系。结果表明,管理层权力与非效率投资总额及投资过度、投资不足之间呈现显著的正相关关系,这种正相关关系只在过度的管理层权力组成立。进一步研究发现,机构投资者异质性对管理层权力与资本配置效率的关系发挥显著的负向调节作用,较之交易型机构投资者来说,稳定型机构投资者能够显著降低管理层权力与非效率投资总额及投资过度之间的正相关关系。本文的结果对提高我国资源配置效率,加强对管理层权力约束机制的建立和完善等,以及对完善我国资本市场中机构投资者发展具有一定的参考意义。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2014, this paper empirically tests the relationship between management power and capital allocation efficiency from the perspective of institutional investor heterogeneity. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the management power and the total amount of inefficient investment and the over-investment and underinvestment. This positive correlation is only established in the excessive management power group. Further studies show that institutional investor heterogeneity plays a significant negative role in regulating the relationship between management power and capital allocation efficiency, compared with transactional institutional investors. Stable institutional investors can significantly reduce the positive correlation between management power and total inefficient investment and excessive investment. The results of this paper have a certain reference significance for improving the efficiency of resource allocation, strengthening the establishment and improvement of the power constraint mechanism of management, and perfecting the development of institutional investors in the capital market of our country.
【作者单位】：广西师范大学漓江学院;
【分类号】：F275;F272.91

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