基于消费者自省的均衡定价领导权和产品定位竞争策略研究

发布时间：2018-06-21 14:57

本文选题：定价领导权 + 定位竞争　；参考：《合肥工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：产品质量定位和定价是企业的两个重要决策。战略定价要求企业准确认识市场的定价领导权结构,同时为缓解同质价格竞争,企业必须构建产品差异化优势获取高额的产品溢价。然而,随着竞争型企业推出的产品新特征越来越复杂,消费者往往对自身的质量偏好不确定。这对企业的价格和质量竞争策略提出了新的挑战,一方面,企业可引导有限理性的消费者自省消除偏好不确定性,另一方面,企业也可改变价格抑制消费者自省,争夺/放弃不确定性消费者。本文考虑部分消费者偏好不确定性市场中,分别建立了竞争企业在三种定价领导权结构(同时定价博弈、高质量企业为领导者的Stackelberg博弈和低质量企业为领导者的Stackelberg博弈)下的产品差异化模型,分析了均衡定价及定位策略,并在产品质量外生和内生两种情形下,分析了竞争企业均衡定价领导权。研究发现:(1)Nash定价均衡策略取决于成本效率(即竞争企业成本差与质量差之间的比值)和自省成本的大小。当自省成本较低且成本效率处于中间水平时,两企业会引导消费者自省;否则,两企业都不会引导消费者自省,且成本效率较高(低)时高(低)质量企业争夺偏好不确定性消费者。随着不确定性消费者比例的增加,企业争夺不确定性消费者的动机增加,引导消费者自省的动机降低。(2)在两种序贯定价情形下,低质量企业为领导者的Stackelberg博弈定价均衡结果与同时定价的Nash均衡结果类似,而在高质量企业为领导者的Stackelberg博弈定价均衡中,高质量企业不会争夺不确定性消费者。(3)两企业在三种博弈顺序下的定位策略表现为:在偏好不确定程度较低时引导消费者自省,在偏好不确定性程度较高时抑制消费者自省。数值算例研究发现,在大多数情况下,高质量企业为领导者的Stackelberg博弈情形下两产品的质量差异最大,Nash均衡的质量差异适中;而在低质量企业为领导者的Stackelberg博弈情形下,质量差异最小。(4)质量水平外生时,竞争企业定价领导权的均衡是一个斗鸡博弈,且后动者更有优势。而在质量水平内生时,定价领导权均衡依赖于消费者的偏好不确定性。上述研究成果不仅丰富了产品差异化和定价领导权的理论研究,并对指导企业的产品差异化策略以及主导权战略决策的制定有一定的实践意义。
[Abstract]:Product quality positioning and pricing are two important decisions of enterprises. Strategic pricing requires an accurate understanding of the pricing leadership structure of the market. At the same time, in order to alleviate the homogeneous price competition, enterprises must construct the product differentiation advantage to obtain a high product premium. However, as the new features of competitive enterprises become more and more complex, consumers tend to be uncertain about their own quality preferences. This poses a new challenge to the price and quality competition strategy of enterprises. On the one hand, enterprises can guide limited rational consumers to introspect themselves to eliminate the uncertainty of preferences, on the other hand, enterprises can also change prices to suppress consumer introspection. Scramble for / give up uncertain consumers. Considering the uncertainty of consumer preference, this paper establishes three pricing leadership structures (simultaneous pricing game) for competitive firms. The product differentiation model under the Stackelberg game of high quality enterprise and the Stackelberg game of low quality enterprise is analyzed, and the equilibrium pricing and positioning strategy are analyzed. The competitive enterprise equilibrium pricing leadership is analyzed. It is found that the equilibrium strategy depends on the cost efficiency (that is, the ratio between the cost difference and the quality difference) and the introspection cost. When introspection costs are low and cost-efficiency is at the intermediate level, the two companies lead consumers to introspection; otherwise, neither enterprise leads consumers to introspection. And the cost efficiency is high (low) when high (low) quality enterprises scramble for consumer preference uncertainty. As the proportion of uncertain consumers increases, the motivation of enterprises to compete for uncertain consumers increases, and the motivation to guide consumers' introspection decreases. The results of Stackelberg game pricing equilibrium of low quality enterprises are similar to those of simultaneous pricing Stackelberg game equilibrium, but in the Stackelberg game equilibrium of high quality enterprises, High-quality enterprises will not compete for uncertain consumers.) the positioning strategies of the two enterprises under the three game order are as follows: lead consumers to introspection when the degree of preference uncertainty is low, and restrain consumer introspection when the degree of preference uncertainty is higher. Numerical examples show that, in most cases, the quality difference between the two products is moderate in the Stackelberg game, but in the Stackelberg game with the leader of the low-quality firm, the difference between the two products is moderate. When the quality level is exogenous, the equilibrium of competitive enterprise pricing leadership is a game of cockfight, and the latter has more advantages. When the quality level is endogenous, pricing leadership equilibrium depends on the uncertainty of consumers' preferences. The above research results not only enrich the theoretical research of product differentiation and pricing leadership, but also have some practical significance to guide the product differentiation strategy and the decision-making of dominant strategy.
【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F273.2

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