Stackelberg竞争下内生技术创新的企业兼并与技术授权

发布时间：2018-06-24 12:18

本文选题：企业兼并 + 技术授权　；参考：《系统管理学报》2017年01期

【摘要】：在具有水平差异的双寡头结构中考虑技术拥有企业作为市场先行者内生决定降低成本技术的程度,借助Stackelberg竞争模型,分析技术的最优转让方式以及技术授权与企业兼并之间的关系。研究表明:企业兼并对技术拥有企业有利,且可以提升社会福利;特许权收费和双重收费方式的技术授权不会发生,应该允许企业兼并。当企业兼并不可行时,是否采用特许权和双重收费方式进行授权,则取决于产品的替代程度;当固定收费方式可行时,应禁止企业兼并;当固定收费优于其他授权方式,但在产品替代程度很强时,固定收费方式可能会降低授权企业利润,需要考虑相应的政策支持以实现企业目标与社会目标的一致。
[Abstract]:In the structure of duopoly with level difference, considering the degree of technological ownership enterprises as market forerunner to decide to reduce the cost of technology endogenously, the Stackelberg competition model is used. This paper analyzes the optimal transfer of technology and the relationship between technology authorization and enterprise merger. The research shows that the merger of enterprises is beneficial to the technologically owned enterprises and can promote the social welfare, and the technology authorization of the concession fee and the double charging mode will not happen, so the merger should be allowed. When merger is not feasible, whether or not to license by means of concession and double charge depends on the degree of substitution of the product; when the fixed fee is feasible, the merger shall be prohibited; and when the fixed charge is superior to other licensing methods, However, when the degree of product substitution is very strong, the fixed charge may reduce the profit of authorized enterprise, so it is necessary to consider the corresponding policy support to realize the consistency of enterprise goal and social goal.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273045;71103030) 教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJC790034)
【分类号】：F273.1;F271

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