声誉维度下薪酬对独立董事有效性的影响——基于独立意见的经验证据

发布时间：2018-06-29 07:55

本文选题：独立董事 + 声誉　；参考：《中南财经政法大学学报》2016年01期

【摘要】：本文利用2005~2012年中国A股市场公开披露的独立董事独立意见数据,以声誉为维度,分别考察了不同声誉水平和不同薪酬与声誉匹配状况下,薪酬对独立董事有效性的影响。研究发现,声誉水平中等或较低以及薪酬明显高于声誉的独立董事群体,其薪酬对有效性具有显著的负面影响。但是,在高声誉水平以及薪酬符合或明显低于声誉的独立董事群体中,薪酬对独立董事有效性不具有显著影响,而且还有证据显示,薪酬对独立董事有效性具有较弱的正面激励作用。这说明薪酬对独立董事有效性的影响具有两面性,除现有文献揭示的、由独立董事制度设计缺陷导致的"天生"负面作用之外,薪酬对独立董事有效性还具有一定的积极作用,这可能是薪酬对独立董事勤勉的工作具有一定的"保障"或正向激励作用引起的。
[Abstract]:Based on the independent opinion data of independent directors published in China's A share market from 2005 to 2012, this paper examines the effects of compensation on the effectiveness of independent directors under different reputation levels and different compensation and reputation matching conditions, taking reputation as the dimension. It is found that the compensation of independent directors with moderate or low reputation level and significantly higher compensation than reputation has a significant negative impact on effectiveness. However, compensation has no significant impact on the effectiveness of independent directors in groups of independent directors with high reputation levels and compensation that is consistent with or significantly lower than that of reputations, and there is evidence that, Compensation has a weak positive incentive effect on the effectiveness of independent directors. This shows that compensation has a dual impact on the effectiveness of independent directors. In addition to the "innate" negative effect caused by the defects in the design of the independent director system, compensation also has a positive effect on the effectiveness of independent directors. This may be due to a certain "guarantee" or positive incentives for the diligent work of independent directors.
【作者单位】：华中师范大学经济与工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F271;F272.92

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