双重股权结构对真实盈余管理行为影响的研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 02:17

本文选题：真实盈余管理 + 双重股权结构　；参考：《西南交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国资本市场还尚未允许的双重股权结构,早在二十世纪二十年代的美国就受到了一定的欢迎,现在双重股权结构在世界各地资本市场的认可度也在不断增加。随着百度、京东等从事互联网业务的知名公司被国内法律制度制约,纷纷以双重股权结构的身份去美国上市,也随着Facebook、Google等国外互联网知名公司不谋而合地选择双重股权结构,双重股权结构这种制度和实践,开始进入公众的视野并且逐渐受到我国学术界的关注。双重股权结构的出现、兴起和发展,在各界对其褒贬不一的评价下,也经历了一个较为波折的过程。所以这一种股权结构有其优势,也有其弊端。其优势在于经营者在进入资本市场募集资金的同时,不会被稀释对公司的控制权,并能够保护企业免遭控制权收购,使得管理者可以对公司实行长期战略。其弊端则为管理团队可能会在已降低的并购压力情形下和失效的董事会监督下,侵害公众投资者的利益并且滥用控制权谋取私利。此类现象的发生可能会使拥有控制权的股东与其他股东之间出现不良的代理问题,则也会伴随盈余管理现象的发生。本文正是从目前国内学术界还未曾有学者研究的双重股权结构与真实盈余管理的关系入手,对双重股权结构的相关概念以及真实盈余管理的相关理论进行阐述,并且以2012-2015年,我国数个成功在国外以双重股权结构上市的公司的财务数据为样本,运用定量分析和定性分析相结合的方法进行了理论分析和实证检验,将选择双重股权结构公司的投票权和现金流权分离的现象与其发生真实盈余管理行为的影响进行研究,在与采用同股同权的公司进行对比后,得出了如下结论:第一,与同股同权结构的公司相比,采用双重股权结构的上市公司,越高的管理层投票权比例,使得真实盈余管理程度上升,二者为正比例关系。第二,双重股权结构的上市公司的管理层的现金流权比例越高,真实盈余管理程度越微弱。第三,双重股权结构的上市公司的管理层投票权比例和现金流权比例的背离程度越大,真实盈余管理程度越强烈。综上来看,本文研究表明了选择双重股权结构的上市公司,真实盈余管理行为的发生较为显著。
[Abstract]:China's capital market has not yet allowed the dual equity structure, as early as the 1920s, the United States has been welcomed, and now the recognition of dual equity structure in the world capital markets is also increasing. As well-known companies such as Baidu, JingDong and others engaged in Internet business have been restricted by domestic legal systems, they have been listed in the United States as a dual equity structure, and with Facebook, JingDong and other well-known foreign Internet companies opting for a dual equity structure, The system and practice of dual ownership structure, which began to enter the public vision and gradually attracted the attention of the academic circles of our country. The emergence, rise and development of dual ownership structure have also experienced a more twists and turns process. So this kind of ownership structure has its advantage, also has its malpractice. Its advantage lies in the fact that the managers can not dilute the control right of the company while they enter the capital market to raise funds, and can protect the enterprises from the acquisition of the control rights, so that the managers can carry out the long-term strategy to the company. The drawback is that the management team may infringe on the interests of public investors and abuse control for private gain under reduced M & A pressure and under the supervision of the ineffective board of directors. The occurrence of this kind of phenomenon may lead to the bad agency problem between the shareholders who have the control right and other shareholders, and it will also accompany the earnings management phenomenon. This paper begins with the relationship between dual equity structure and real earnings management, which has not been studied by scholars in China at present, expounds the related concepts of dual ownership structure and the relevant theories of real earnings management, and takes 2012-2015 as an example to analyze the relationship between dual ownership structure and real earnings management. In this paper, the financial data of several companies listed in foreign countries with dual equity structure are used as samples, and the theoretical analysis and empirical test are carried out by combining quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis. This paper studies the phenomenon of separation of voting rights and cash flow rights of companies with dual ownership structure and the impact of real earnings management on them. After comparing with the companies adopting the same share and same rights, the following conclusions are drawn: first, Compared with the companies with the same shares and the same rights, the higher the voting ratio of the management, the higher the voting ratio of the listed companies with dual equity structure, which leads to the rise of the real earnings management degree, and the two are in direct proportion. Second, the higher the cash flow right ratio of the listed companies with dual equity structure, the weaker the real earnings management. Third, the greater the deviation between the voting rights of management and the proportion of cash flow rights, the stronger the real earnings management degree of dual equity structure listed companies. In summary, the research shows that the real earnings management behavior of the listed companies with dual equity structure is significant.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F49

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