碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-07-11 17:44

本文选题：奖励与惩罚机制 + 碳排放约束　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年10期

【摘要】：在静态和动态碳减排奖励与惩罚机制下,考虑碳排放约束的地方政府和企业群体行为的演化博弈,重点分析了碳配额、碳交易价格、政府监督成本和企业减排投资(减排效果参数)对演化稳定策略(ESS)的影响,最后进行了算例分析。研究结果表明:在动态奖励与惩罚机制下,地方政府和企业的演化轨迹围绕着唯一的演化稳定策略螺旋趋近。碳配额对地方政府监督策略的作用与企业单位减排量市场收益的大小有关,政府监督成本和减排效果参数对地方政府监督策略起负向作用;政府监督成本对企业诚实减排策略起负向作用。随着碳交易价格的不断上升,地方政府监督的积极性先增加后降低,企业碳交易行为由购入碳排放权转为出售碳排放权,但是地方政府监督行为的转变滞后于企业减排行为的转变。研究结果对碳交易体系下政府减排策略制定和企业减排投资具有较强启示。
[Abstract]:Under the static and dynamic carbon abatement incentive and punishment mechanism, the evolutionary game between local government and enterprise group behavior considering the carbon emission constraint is discussed, and the carbon quota and carbon trading price are analyzed. The effects of government supervision cost and enterprise emission reduction investment (emission reduction effect parameters) on evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) are analyzed. The results show that under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the evolution path of local government and enterprise approaches to a spiral around the only evolutionary stabilization strategy. The effect of carbon quota on local government supervision strategy is related to the market income of enterprise unit emission reduction, and the cost of government supervision and the parameters of emission reduction effect play a negative role in local government supervision strategy. The cost of government supervision plays a negative role in the honest emission reduction strategy of enterprises. As the price of carbon trading continues to rise, the enthusiasm of local governments for supervision increases first and then decreases. The carbon trading behavior of enterprises changes from buying carbon emission rights to selling carbon emission rights. But the transformation of local government supervision behavior lags behind the change of enterprise emission reduction behavior. The research results have strong implications for government emission reduction strategy formulation and enterprise emission reduction investment under carbon trading system.
【作者单位】：合肥工业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目资助(71573069,71271074,71503065) 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(14YJC630061)
【分类号】：F224.32;F270;F279.2;X321

【相似文献】