机构持股、终极产权与内部控制缺陷

发布时间：2018-07-12 18:13

本文选题：机构投资者 + 终极产权　；参考：《会计研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：依据机构持股具有的"有效监督"假说和"利益冲突"假说,本文从三个维度实证检验机构持股对内部控制缺陷的影响。研究发现:机构持股与内部控制缺陷显著负相关,大机构投资者(持股比率大于3%)对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更强,验证了机构持股的"有效监督"假说;与非独立型机构投资者相比,独立型机构投资者对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更大;与短期机构投资者相比,长期机构投资者更能抑制内部控制缺陷的产生。此外,终极产权性质会影响机构持股对内部控制缺陷的治理监督作用,总的来说,机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在非国企中更为明显,且不同类型机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在国企与非国企中存在差异。
[Abstract]:According to the hypothesis of "effective supervision" and "conflict of interest" of institutional shareholding, this paper empirically examines the influence of institutional shareholding on internal control defects from three dimensions. It is found that institutional shareholding is negatively correlated with internal control defects, and that large institutional investors (holding ratio more than 3%) have a stronger inhibitory effect on internal control defects, which verifies the hypothesis of "effective supervision" of institutional shareholding. Compared with the non-independent institutional investors, the independent institutional investors can restrain the internal control defects more greatly; compared with the short-term institutional investors, the long-term institutional investors can restrain the internal control defects more effectively. In addition, the nature of ultimate property rights will influence the governance and supervision of internal control defects by institutional shareholding. In general, the inhibition effect of institutional shareholding on internal control defects is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises. There are differences between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in the inhibition of internal control defects by different types of institutional shareholdings.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(JBK151119、JBK170930)的阶段成果
【分类号】：F271;F272.92;F275

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