产品失效率特征对延长担保服务供应链协调的影响
发布时间：2018-07-14 16:20
【摘要】：本文主要研究产品失效率特征对延长担保服务供应链的影响,我们假设这个延长担保服务供应链中只有一个制造商和一个零售商以及很多的消费者。接着我们利用Stackelberg主从博弈模型对零售商和制造商的延长担保销售渠道和定价决策进行综合分析,并对延长担保服务供应链的协调策略进行研究。研究结果能够对零售商和制造商的经营运作管理带来一些建议,同时帮助商家更好地根据产品的失效率特性设计更为合理的延长担保产品。这篇文章首次研究三种产品失效率对产品延长担保政策的影响,包括恒定的失效率,上升的失效率以及下降的失效率,并且我们还对比了两种延长担保销售渠道:零售商或制造商提供延长担保。研究表明,恒定的失效率、上升的失效率和下降的失效率对延长担保服务供应链的协调会产生不同的影响,在恒定失效率和上升失效率的情况下,延长担保由零售商提供时其长度要大于由制造商提供的延长担保长度,而在下降失效率的情况下,却有可能是由制造商提供的延长担保长度更长。我们还发现,在失效率恒定或上升的情况下,延长担保的长度越长,只购买产品不购买延长担保的人数越多,而在失效率下降的情况下,延长担保的长度越长,只购买产品不购买延长担保的人数越少。从系统总利润来看,当制造商和零售商的单位维修成本相同时,制造商提供延长担保时的系统利润要大于零售商提供延长担保时的系统利润。从制造商和零售商各自的利润来看,我们发现,不管是制造商还是零售商,由自己提供延长担保比由对方提供延长担保更有利。
[Abstract]:This paper mainly studies the effect of product failure rate characteristics on extending guarantee service supply chain. We assume that there is only one manufacturer and one retailer and many consumers in the extended guarantee service supply chain. Then we use the Stackelberg master-slave model to extend the distribution channel and pricing of the guarantee for the retailer and the manufacturer. This paper makes a comprehensive analysis and studies the coordination strategy of extending the guarantee service supply chain. The results can bring some suggestions to the management of the retailer and the manufacturer, and help the merchants to better design more reasonable extended guarantee products according to the product's failure rate characteristics. This article first studies three kinds of production. The effect of product loss efficiency on product extension guarantee policy, including constant failure rate, rising failure rate, and decreasing failure rate, and we also compare two extension guarantee sales channels: retailers or manufacturers provide extended guarantee. Research shows that constant failure rate, rising failure rate and decline rate are extended guarantee The coordination of the service supply chain will have different effects. In the case of constant failure rate and rising failure rate, the length of the guarantee is longer than the lengthening guarantee length provided by the manufacturer when the retailer is provided, but the lengthening guarantee length provided by the manufacturer is longer in the case of decline inefficiency. We also found that the length of the guarantee is longer. When the failure rate is constant or rising, the longer the length of the guarantee is extended, the more people only purchase the product to extend the guarantee, and the longer the length of the guarantee is extended, the less the number of the guarantee is extended, the less the number of the guarantee is purchased. From the total profit of the system, the unit maintenance of the manufacturer and the retailer At the same cost, the manufacturer provides a greater system profit for extending the guarantee than the retailer provides the system's profit to extend the guarantee. From the respective profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, we find that it is more favorable for us to extend the guarantee than to provide an extension of the guarantee by the manufacturer and the retailer.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
本文编号：2122221
[Abstract]:This paper mainly studies the effect of product failure rate characteristics on extending guarantee service supply chain. We assume that there is only one manufacturer and one retailer and many consumers in the extended guarantee service supply chain. Then we use the Stackelberg master-slave model to extend the distribution channel and pricing of the guarantee for the retailer and the manufacturer. This paper makes a comprehensive analysis and studies the coordination strategy of extending the guarantee service supply chain. The results can bring some suggestions to the management of the retailer and the manufacturer, and help the merchants to better design more reasonable extended guarantee products according to the product's failure rate characteristics. This article first studies three kinds of production. The effect of product loss efficiency on product extension guarantee policy, including constant failure rate, rising failure rate, and decreasing failure rate, and we also compare two extension guarantee sales channels: retailers or manufacturers provide extended guarantee. Research shows that constant failure rate, rising failure rate and decline rate are extended guarantee The coordination of the service supply chain will have different effects. In the case of constant failure rate and rising failure rate, the length of the guarantee is longer than the lengthening guarantee length provided by the manufacturer when the retailer is provided, but the lengthening guarantee length provided by the manufacturer is longer in the case of decline inefficiency. We also found that the length of the guarantee is longer. When the failure rate is constant or rising, the longer the length of the guarantee is extended, the more people only purchase the product to extend the guarantee, and the longer the length of the guarantee is extended, the less the number of the guarantee is extended, the less the number of the guarantee is purchased. From the total profit of the system, the unit maintenance of the manufacturer and the retailer At the same cost, the manufacturer provides a greater system profit for extending the guarantee than the retailer provides the system's profit to extend the guarantee. From the respective profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, we find that it is more favorable for us to extend the guarantee than to provide an extension of the guarantee by the manufacturer and the retailer.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
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