随机需求和产量下基于损失规避的零售商博弈
发布时间：2018-07-25 18:42
【摘要】：研究在需求和产量均为随机变量的情况下,带有损失规避偏好的零售商之间的博弈.当多个相同的零售商向同一供应商订购时,如果总需求按照每个零售商的订购量在总订购量中所占比例进行分配,则该博弈中存在唯一的对称性Nash均衡,且总均衡订购量关于损失规避水平递减,关于零售商数量递增.此外,如果损失规避水平(零售商数量)高于(低于)临界值,则竞争情况下供应链总库存水平比集中管理情况下的低.仿真实验验证了上述结果.
[Abstract]:This paper studies the game between retailers with loss aversion preference under the condition that demand and output are both random variables. When multiple same retailers order from the same supplier, if the aggregate demand is allocated according to the proportion of the order volume of each retailer, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game. And the total equilibrium order level of loss-aversion decline, about the number of retailers increasing. In addition, if the level of loss avoidance (the number of retailers) is above (below) the critical value, the total inventory level of the supply chain under competition is lower than that under centralized management. Simulation results verify the above results.
【作者单位】： 军事经济学院基础部;清华大学自动化系;湖北经济学院工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(61273233) 高等学校博士点基金项目(20120002110035,20130002130010)
【分类号】：F274
，
本文编号：2144704
[Abstract]:This paper studies the game between retailers with loss aversion preference under the condition that demand and output are both random variables. When multiple same retailers order from the same supplier, if the aggregate demand is allocated according to the proportion of the order volume of each retailer, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game. And the total equilibrium order level of loss-aversion decline, about the number of retailers increasing. In addition, if the level of loss avoidance (the number of retailers) is above (below) the critical value, the total inventory level of the supply chain under competition is lower than that under centralized management. Simulation results verify the above results.
【作者单位】： 军事经济学院基础部;清华大学自动化系;湖北经济学院工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(61273233) 高等学校博士点基金项目(20120002110035,20130002130010)
【分类号】：F274
，
本文编号：2144704
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