国企价值增值、高管努力选择与最优长期激励研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-08-09 10:33

【摘要】：将国企高管的经营管理行为分为两类,一类偏重于提升企业的短期业绩,另一类偏重于提升企业的长期价值。从理论和实证角度论证,合理的薪酬制度应该建立与高管的两类行为相匹配的激励机制,即引入以股权激励为主的长期激励,并在长、短期激励之间建立一个适宜比例。通过对2010-2014年间实施股权激励的528家上市国企和民企的实证分析表明:在短期激励方面,国企高于民企;在长期激励方面,国企低于民企。建议在国企高管薪酬制度改革中,不仅要降低、限制短期激励,还要相应地提升长期激励,同时通过完善股权激励实施的治理环境、业绩考核标准等推进国企高管的薪酬制度改革。
[Abstract]:The management behavior of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises is divided into two categories, one is focused on improving the short-term performance of enterprises, the other is on enhancing the long-term value of enterprises. From the theoretical and empirical point of view, a reasonable compensation system should be established to match the two types of executive behavior incentive mechanism, that is, the introduction of long-term incentive based on equity incentives, and establish a suitable proportion between long-term and short-term incentives. The empirical analysis of 528 listed state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in 2010-2014 shows that in short-term incentive, state-owned enterprise is higher than private enterprise; in long-term incentive, state-owned enterprise is lower than private enterprise. In the reform of the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises, we should not only reduce and limit the short-term incentive, but also improve the long-term incentive correspondingly, and at the same time, improve the governance environment of the equity incentive implementation. The performance appraisal standard and so on promotes the state-owned enterprise executive's salary system reform.
【作者单位】：复旦大学管理学院;南昌大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71372115)
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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