非执行董事与独立董事对高管在职消费的影响研究

发布时间：2018-08-23 19:57

【摘要】：作为契约不完备性的产物,在职消费可能是对高管的隐性激励。但是,媒体频频曝光的“天价烟酒”、“天价名片”等诸多事实表明,在职消费远超出了合理范围,会带来不利经济后果,成为股东与高管之间代理冲突的重要表现形式之一。如何有效抑制高管过度在职消费行为是董事会职责的重要内容。以往文献一度以独立董事的治理结果代表董事会治理效果,较少关注其他类别的董事。事实上,我国上市公司董事会成员包括执行董事、独立董事和非执行董事三类,直接由股东派驻的非执行董事相对于内部管理者可能更独立,在监督治理过程中不易受到高管的牵制。非执行董事是否同独立董事一样提高董事会独立性、监督高管,从而约束高管机会主义行为、缓解委托代理冲突是本文的研究重点。基于以往研究,本文从高管在职消费角度研究非执行董事与独立董事的监督治理作用,同时比较非执行董事与独立董事的治理效果。在此基础上,本文进一步探索不同股权性质或不同股权制衡度情形下,非执行董事与独立董事对高管在职消费的监督治理。本文选取2009-2013年我国沪市A股上市公司为样本,运用SPSS软件进行多元线性回归检验研究假设。实证结果表明,高管在职消费与非执行董事比例呈负相关关系,而高管在职消费与独立董事比例呈正相关关系,说明非执行董事能够抑制高管在职消费,独立董事没有发挥预期作用,反而加大了高管在职消费程度,且非执行董事对高管在职消费的治理效果优于独立董事。研究还发现,相比在国有公司中,在非国有公司中非执行董事对高管在职消费的监督作用更明显,在股权制衡度高时非执行董事对高管在职消费的监督抑制作用更明显;在国有公司或股权制衡度低的公司中,高管在职消费水平与独立董事比例的相关关系显著为正。本文深入分析董事会结构和独立性,从新的视角丰富了董事会治理效果的经验证据。本文的研究也为我国政府监管机构、上市公司进一步完善公司治理结构、缓解代理冲突及降低代理成本提供新的思路和启示。
[Abstract]:As the product of contract incompleteness, on-the-job consumption may be a hidden incentive to executives. However, many facts such as "sky-price tobacco and wine" and "sky-price business card" frequently exposed by the media show that the consumption on the job is far beyond the reasonable range, which will bring adverse economic consequences and become one of the important forms of proxy conflict between shareholders and executives. How to effectively restrain executives' excessive on-the-job consumption behavior is an important content of board duties. The previous literature used to represent the governance effect of the board of directors by the governance results of independent directors, and less attention was paid to other categories of directors. In fact, the board members of listed companies in China include executive directors, independent directors and non-executive directors. The non-executive directors who are directly assigned by shareholders may be more independent than internal managers. In the supervision of governance process is not easy to be constrained by the executive. Whether the non-executive directors and independent directors improve the independence of the board of directors, supervise the senior executives, so as to restrain the executive opportunism behavior, alleviate the principal-agent conflict is the focus of this paper. Based on the previous studies, this paper studies the supervisory governance role of non-executive directors and independent directors from the perspective of in-service consumption of executives, and compares the governance effects of non-executive directors and independent directors at the same time. On this basis, this paper further explores the non-executive directors and independent directors' supervision and governance of the executive's in-service consumption under the circumstances of different equity nature or different equity checks and balances. In this paper, A shares listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013 are selected as samples, and the hypothesis of multivariate linear regression test is tested by using SPSS software. The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between the in-service consumption of senior executives and the proportion of non-executive directors, while there is a positive correlation between in-service consumption of senior executives and the proportion of independent directors, indicating that non-executive directors can restrain the in-service consumption of senior executives. Independent directors did not play the expected role, but increased the level of in-service consumption of senior executives, and non-executive directors of the executive consumption of in-service management effect is better than that of independent directors. It is also found that the non-executive directors in non-state-owned companies have a more obvious supervisory effect on the in-service consumption of senior executives than in state-owned companies, and the non-executive directors have more obvious supervision and restraint on the in-service consumption of senior executives when the degree of equity checks and balances is high. In state-owned companies or companies with low equity checks and balances, the correlation between the level of in-service consumption and the proportion of independent directors is significantly positive. This paper deeply analyzes the structure and independence of the board of directors, which enriches the empirical evidence of the governance effect of the board of directors from a new perspective. The research in this paper also provides new ideas and inspiration for our government supervision and listed companies to further improve the corporate governance structure, alleviate agency conflicts and reduce agency costs.
【学位授予单位】：兰州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F272.91

【参考文献】