授权分销商与灰色市场投机者的Stackelberg竞争分析

发布时间：2018-10-12 13:45

【摘要】：本文针对现有文献忽略了授权分销商与灰色市场投机者的市场力量差异的研究现状,考虑由一个制造商和两个处于不同国家市场的分销商组成的跨国供应链(其中一个分销商参与灰色市场投机),构建了以授权分销商为领导者和以灰色市场投机者为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型.首先给出了批发价格合同下各节点企业的均衡策略,分析发现:与授权分销商和灰色市场投机者同时决策情形相比,i)授权分销商在其与灰色市场投机者序贯决策时能获得更高的利润;ii)制造商在二者序贯决策情形下能获得较高的利润;iii)授权分销商先决策可以降低灰市产品的销量和灰色市场投机者的投机利润.然后引入两部定价合同,并通过设定合理参数以实现供应链中各节点企业的帕累托改进.
[Abstract]:In this paper, the current situation of research on the difference of market forces between authorized distributors and grey market speculators is ignored. Considering a multinational supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two distributors in different national markets (one of whom is engaged in grey market speculation), an authorized distributor leader and a grey market speculator are constructed Stackelberg game model for follower. Firstly, the equilibrium strategy of each node enterprise under wholesale price contract is given. It is found that the, i) authorized distributor can obtain higher profit than the authorized distributor and the grey market speculator in making the decision at the same time. The; ii) manufacturer can obtain higher profit in the case of sequential decision between the authorized distributor and the speculator in the grey market. Higher profits; iii) allows distributors to make decisions first and reduces sales of grey market products and speculative profits of grey market speculators. Then two pricing contracts are introduced, and the Pareto improvement of each node enterprise in the supply chain is realized by setting reasonable parameters.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71531003);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272129) 四川青年科技基金(2013JQ0031)~~
【分类号】：F274

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